In an article written for Foreign Affairs, Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Jason Q. Ng discusses the crackdown of “rumours” on the popular Chinese WeChat mobile application, and its broader implications for censorship in the country.
Posts tagged “Censorship”
In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.
At the 2015 USENIX Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI) workshop, held in Washington DC on August 10, Citizen Lab and collaborators present three papers.
The papers include: investigation of censorship and surveillance on China’s most popular social video platforms, an updated analysis of China’s Great Canon, and examination of securing cookie-based identifiers from passive surveillance.
Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert spoke at the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), joining a panel discussion on “The Global Campaign Against Democratic Norms.”
This report is an analysis of the types of content removed by WeChat on its public accounts (also known as “official accounts”) blogging platform.
China’s censorship of social media platforms has largely been focused on speech that targets or criticizes the government, until recently. The Cyberspace Administration of China’s new regulations will target sexual innuendo, in particular 25 of the most popular “dirty words” in China.
Cyber Stewards Network partner 7iber marked it’s founding anniversary on Jordan’s independence day by highlighting the poor state of press freedom and women’s rights in the country.
This post describes our analysis of China’s “Great Cannon,” our term for an attack tool that we identify as separate from, but co-located with, the Great Firewall of China. The first known usage of the Great Cannon is in the recent large-scale novel DDoS attack on both GitHub and servers used by GreatFire.org.
Citizen Lab Research Fellow Jason Q. Ng commented on the effect that China’s real name registration policy will have on virtual private networks (VPNs) and self-censorship.
Slate’s discussion on the proliferation of Chinese messaging applications worldwide was informed by Citizen Lab research report “Asia Chats: Analyzing Information Controls & Privacy in Asian Messaging Applications.”