To whom it may concern:

The Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, has identified a coordinated network of inauthentic digital assets on Meta's platforms dedicated to suppressing the pro-democracy movement in Thailand. In this letter, we summarize our research findings, provide a list of questions to Meta related to this research, and offer a set of recommendations for how Meta could address the concerns we have raised.

Our research findings

We summarize our findings as follows:

- Since at least August 2020, a coordinated social media harassment and doxxing campaign targeting the Thai pro-democracy movement has run uninterrupted and unchallenged. We codenamed it JUICYJAM.
- Thanks to a public leak of confidential military and police documents that occurred in March 2025, we can now attribute the campaign to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the Royal Thai Police, whose online repression efforts have allegedly been merged since 2023 into a joint "Cyber Team".
- The campaign operates within a broader context of dissent repression tactics, both online and offline, that closely resemble those we have previously analyzed in other countries – such as, for example, in Hong Kong.
- JUICYJAM's longstanding, uninterrupted activity over multiple social media platforms (primarily X and Facebook, in this case) once again exposes the shortcomings of platforms in creating and enforcing policies on highly coordinated and harmful doxxing campaigns intended to suppress civil society.
- Platforms' policies on doxxing seldom consider the behaviour in the context of coordinated – and often state-sponsored – campaigns against civil society. They also do not consider environmental factors, such as the doxxing happening during unrest and protests.

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T: 416.946.8929 F: 416.946.8877

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Questions to Meta

We would appreciate your timely response to the following questions:

1. What steps does Meta take to ensure that victims of doxxing – defined as the search for and the publication of an individual's personal data on the Internet with malicious intent – can report the disclosure of their Personally Identifiable Information, including but not limited to residential information, and have it removed from its platforms?
2. Are Meta's policies on doxxing exclusively captured within the "Privacy Violations" section of the company's Community Standards or are they also covered by other policies? If so, which ones?
3. Do Meta's policies on doxxing extend equally to all platforms owned by Meta - i.e. Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, Threads, WhatsApp, Meta Horizon?
4. Do those policies extend equally across all product types – i.e. Profiles, Pages, Groups, and their equivalent names on platforms other than Facebook – within all platforms owned by Meta?
5. Is the issue of *coordinated doxxing*, particularly in the context of a consequent risk of violence or harassment, specifically captured within Meta's Community Standards? If so, where and how?
6. Is Meta's response to the [Oversight Board's Policy Advisory Opinion (PAO)](#) recommendations on sharing residential information, last updated on June 12, 2023, the most current attempt by Meta to address doxxing?
7. Can you confirm that recommendations #11 and #12 of the aforementioned PAO, specifically, were not implemented by Meta on any of its platforms?
8. Was Meta aware of doxxing being a tactic deployed by the Thai government in the repression of the pro-democracy protests since at least 2020?

Recommendations to Meta

We make the following recommendations to Meta to address concerns raised by our work:

1. **Provide an easily accessible and responsive way (i.e. a hotline) for victims of doxxing to report the malicious public sharing of their private content**. The content should be quickly removed after Meta verified it as the product of doxxing.

2. **Implement instruments for Meta to identify, and remove, networks acting in a coordinated manner to conduct doxxing**. The action should not only consist in the removal of individual pieces of content, but in the simultaneous removal, permanent ban, and subsequent monitoring of the networked actors responsible for the malicious activity.

3. **Develop and implement instruments for the protection of civil society from doxxing** through Meta's platforms in hybrid and authoritarian regimes according to The Economist Democracy Index, or Partly Free and Not Free countries according Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey. Such instruments should include appropriate solutions on both the policy and the technological side.

4. **Conduct an audit on the existence and activity of potential coordinated doxxing networks**, with priority on illiberal countries as defined per point above. Implement a coordinated removal of the networks confirmed as conducting doxxing. Publicly disclose proven cases of state-sponsored doxxing networks.

We plan to publish a report reflecting our research. We would appreciate a response to this letter from your company as soon as possible, which we commit to publish in full alongside our research report provided this correspondence is received before 5pm Eastern Time on Friday 11 April 2025.

Sincerely,

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