



## To whom it may concern:

The Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, has identified a sustained, longstanding campaign on X's platform dedicated to suppressing the pro-democracy movement in Thailand. In this letter, we summarize our research findings, provide a list of questions to X related to this research, and offer a set of recommendations for how X could address the concerns we have raised.

## Our research findings

We summarize our findings as follows:

- Since at least August 2020, a coordinated social media harassment and doxxing campaign targeting the Thai pro-democracy movement has run uninterrupted and unchallenged. We codenamed it JUICYJAM.
- Thanks to a public leak of confidential military and police documents that occurred in March 2025, we can now attribute the campaign to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the Royal Thai Police, whose online repression efforts have allegedly been merged since 2023 into a joint "Cyber Team".
- The campaign operates within a broader context of dissent repression tactics, both online and offline, that closely resemble those we have previously analyzed in other countries – such as, for example, in Hong Kong.
- JUICYJAM's longstanding, uninterrupted activity over multiple social media platforms (primarily X and Facebook, in this case) once again exposes the shortcomings of platforms in creating and enforcing policies on highly coordinated and harmful doxxing campaigns intended to suppress civil society.
- Platforms' policies on doxxing seldom consider the behaviour in the context of coordinated – and often state-sponsored – campaigns against civil society. They also do not consider environmental factors, such as the doxxing happening during unrest and protests.







## Questions to X

We would appreciate your timely response to the following questions:

- 1. What steps does X take to ensure that victims of doxxing defined as the search for and the publication of an individual's personal data on the Internet with malicious intent – can report the disclosure of their Personally Identifiable Information, including but not limited to residential information, and have it removed from its platform?
- 2. Are X's policies on doxxing exclusively captured within the "Private Content" section of the company's Help Center? If not, where else are X's policies on *doxxing* described?
- 3. Do those policies extend equally across all product types i.e. Profiles, Messages Communities, Grok within the X platform?
- 4. Is the issue of *coordinated doxxing*, particularly in the context of a consequent risk of violence or harassment, specifically captured within X's Help Center? If so, where and how?
- 5. Did X continue monitoring influence operations (IOs) enacted by the Thai government, following the disclosure by the company in October 2020 of an IO attributed to the Royal Thai Army?

## Recommendations to X

We make the following recommendations to X to address concerns raised by our work:

- 1. Provide an easily accessible and responsive way (i.e. a hotline) for victims of doxxing to report the malicious public sharing of their private content. The content should be quickly removed after X verified it as the product of doxxing.
- Implement instruments for X to identify, and remove, networks acting in a
  coordinated manner to conduct doxxing. The action should not only consist in the
  removal of individual pieces of content, but in the simultaneous removal, permanent ban,
  and subsequent monitoring of the networked actors responsible for the malicious activity.







- 3. **Develop and implement instruments for the protection of civil society from doxxing** through X's platforms in hybrid and authoritarian regimes according to The Economist Democracy Index, or Partly Free and Not Free countries according Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey. Such instruments should include appropriate solutions on both the policy and the technological side.
- 4. Conduct an audit on the existence and activity of potential coordinated doxxing networks, with priority on illiberal countries as defined per point above. Implement a coordinated removal of the networks confirmed as conducting doxxing. Publicly disclose proven cases of state-sponsored doxxing networks.

We plan to publish a report reflecting our research. We would appreciate a response to this letter from your company as soon as possible, which we commit to publish in full alongside our research report provided this correspondence is received before 5pm Eastern Time on Friday 11 April 2025.

Sincerely,



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