

Submission to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances and the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances on the enforced disappearance of migrants in the context of transnational repression

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
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I. Introduction

We would like to express our gratitude for the Committee on Enforced Disappearances and the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances' attention to the issue of enforced disappearances in the context of transnational repression. Transnational repression is a pressing global human rights problem that is commanding the attention of states and United Nations offices and special procedures. Enforced disappearances via unlawful deportations and forced renditions constitute a widespread form of transnational repression, and therefore deserves the careful consideration of the Committee and the Working Group. The present submission aims to draw the Committee and the Working Group's attention to two intersecting issues relevant to this call for inputs: 1) the unique vulnerability of migrants to enforced disappearances via unlawful deportations and forced renditions, and 2) the role host states play in facilitating the enforced disappearance of migrants in the context of transnational repression.

Previous reports by the Working Group have observed the "direct link between enforced disappearance and migration," including as a consequence of political abduction, detention, or deportation.¹ For migrants who are fleeing political persecution, the threat of transnational repression compounds these risks. A quarter of the world's states are using transnational repression to silence dissent outside their borders,² often via collaboration with other states to detain and forcibly return targeted individuals. Unfortunately, the anti-migrant policies of host states are leading to increased opportunities for transnational repression.

This submission will highlight the ways origin states target migrants for unlawful deportations and forced renditions, and the involvement of host states in the removal process. This submission will then call attention to the broader factors contributing to this issue, including the hostile policies of host states towards migrants; a lack of adequate resourcing for the processing of migrant cases in host states; and migrant-related data sharing agreements among states, including expansive collection of migrant data that fails to incorporate or effectuate privacy safeguards. Finally, this submission will offer recommendations to host states on how to address the problem of enforced disappearances of migrants in the context of transnational repression.

¹ United Nation Human Rights Council (2017), "Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on Enforced Disappearances in the Context of Migration," *United Nations* <<https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/36/39/Add.2>>.

² Grady Vaughan, Yana Gorokhovskaia and Nate Schenkkan(2025), "Ten Findings from Ten Years of Data on Transnational Repression," *Freedom House* <<https://freedomhouse.org/article/ten-findings-ten-years-data-transnational-repression>>.

II. Contextualizing the Problem

The United Nations Human Rights Office defines transnational repression as “acts conducted or directed by a State, or its proxy, to deter, silence or punish dissent, criticism or human rights advocacy towards it, expressed from outside its territory.”³ Victims of transnational repression have national or diasporic ties to the perpetrating state, and generally fall into two broad but not mutually exclusive categories: people targeted due to their activities (ex. human rights defenders, political exiles, and former insiders with access to sensitive business or political information), and people targeted due to their identity (ex. members of persecuted ethnic and religious communities). In attempting to silence these individuals, perpetrating origin states use various coercive tactics, ranging from physical attacks and digital harassment, to mobility controls and threats against family members.⁴

For the purpose of this submission, we are confining our analysis to the forced return of migrants from a host state due to the direct intervention of a perpetrating origin state. These forced returns typically take one of two forms: unlawful deportations or forced renditions. According to data from Freedom House, unlawful deportations and forced renditions made up 20.1% and 3.6% of all publicly documented cases of physical transnational repression between 2014 and 2024, respectively.⁵ These two forms of transnational repression can be distinguished from one another according to the means by which victims are forcibly returned.

Unlawful deportations occur most often through immigration proceedings, where judicial oversight and protection of individual rights tend to be weaker. Collective expulsions at the request of perpetrating host states, “without an individual assessment of each person’s case before their return,”⁶ are often done under the guise of immigration enforcement. Expulsions can also take place through formal extraditions that fall short of adherence to legal protections, though these cases are less frequent. In contrast, forced renditions occur without any pretense, or only the slightest one, of adhering to lawful procedures for the removal of victims. Operating

³ United Nations, “Transnational Repression,” *United Nations* <<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/transnational-repression-1-en.pdf>>.

⁴ Tactics include direct attacks, co-opting other countries, mobility controls, and threats from a distance. See: Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer (2021), “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach,” *Freedom House* <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf>.

⁵ Freedom House data 2014-2024

⁶ Gehad Madi (2025), “Externalization of Migration Governance and its Effect on the Human Rights of Migrants,” *United Nations* <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a80302-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants-gehad-madi>>.

inside the borders of the host state, agents of the origin state use physical coercion and threats to compel a victim to return to the origin state.

Because unlawful deportations and forced renditions occur outside of proper legal procedures, with limited or no public oversight and few if any opportunities for victims to contest their removal, they invariably involve the enforced disappearance of victims. Enforced disappearances may occur at different stages of removal: when the victim is first detained in a host state, when the victim is removed, or after the victim is returned to their country of origin.

Those most likely to be unlawfully deported or forcibly rendered are migrants who lack host state citizenship. Migrants, whose security is contingent on the policies of host state authorities, already face the risk of enforced disappearances as a result of immigration detention and expulsion by host states, as noted by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants.⁷ For migrants fleeing political repression in their origin state and who are also targets of transnational repression, their vulnerability to enforced disappearance via forced removal is even greater.

III. Host State Participation

A key feature of the unlawful deportation or forced renditions of migrants in the context of transnational repression is the involvement of host state authorities. Most cases of physical transnational repression involve cooperation between origin and host states.⁸ In cases of forced returns, perpetrating origin states request host states to assist them in apprehending, detaining, and forcibly expelling targeted individuals.

The rights impacts of these unlawful deportations and forced renditions are well known, as are the obligations of host states under international law to protect individuals from abuse. In particular, host states have a responsibility to adhere to the principle of non-refoulement and ensure that migrants are not returned to origin states where they could face disappearance, torture, or other irreparable harms.⁹ Yet, as the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and

⁷ Gehad Madi (2025), "Phenomenon of Migrants Going Missing or Subjected to Enforced Disappearance," *United Nations* <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5949-phenomenon-migrants-going-missing-or-subjected-enforced>>.

⁸ Physical transnational repression includes "detention, assault, physical intimidation, unlawful deportation, rendition, or suspected assassination." See: Michaelsen, Marcus, and Kris Ruijgrok (2023), "Autocracy's Long Reach: Explaining Host Country Influences on Transnational Repression," *Democratization* 31(2).

⁹ United Nations Human Rights, "The Principle of Non-refoulement under International Human Rights Law," *United Nations*.

protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has noted in regards to journalists in exile, host states are “unwilling for political reasons or unable for lack of capacity or resources to protect and support” those vulnerable to attack.¹⁰

Why host states cooperate with origin states to forcibly return and disappear victims may be informed by different factors, including complementary policy objectives, shared political interests, or disregard of the risks posed by cooperation. Host states pursuing their own anti-migrant policies may be inclined to facilitate the forced return of migrants, even when these individuals are known to be targets of transnational repression and where forced removal could result in enforced disappearance. For example, at the request of the government of the People’s Republic of China, the government of Thailand collectively expelled approximately one hundred Uyghurs to China in 2015¹¹, and a further forty in 2025¹², despite these individuals belonging to an ethnic community subject to intense state repression inside China and transnational repression abroad. In defending the forcible return of forty Uyghurs to China in 2025, spokespeople for the government of Thailand and the government of China reportedly both described the action as a response to people who they claim had “illegally” entered Thailand.¹³

Where host and origin states share similar authoritarian political systems or illiberal policy priorities, or where host states have close bilateral ties with a perpetrating origin state, host states may ignore the severe human rights implications of forced returns. For example, the government of Turkey has conducted an extensive campaign of renditions targeting individuals it claims are members of the Gülen movement. To facilitate these forced renditions, Turkish authorities have in notable instances relied on the cooperation of authorities in host countries like Kosovo and Mongolia.¹⁴ Other notable instances of forced renditions among authoritarian

¹⁰ [<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf>](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf).

¹¹ United Nations Human Rights (2024), “Journalists in Exile,” *United Nations*

[<https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5653-journalists-exile-report-special-rapporteur-promotion-and>](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5653-journalists-exile-report-special-rapporteur-promotion-and).

¹² Human Rights Watch (2015), “Thailand: 100 Ethnic Turks Forcibly Sent to China,” *Human Rights Watch* (July 9 2015)

[<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/09/thailand-100-ethnic-turks-forcibly-sent-china>](https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/09/thailand-100-ethnic-turks-forcibly-sent-china).

¹³ Ravina Shamdasani (2025), “UN Human Rights Chief deeply troubled by Thailand’s deportation of Uyghurs to China,” *United Nations Human Rights* (February 27 2025)

[<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/un-human-rights-chief-deeply-troubled-thailands-deportation-uyghurs-china>](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/un-human-rights-chief-deeply-troubled-thailands-deportation-uyghurs-china).

¹⁴ Sui-Lee Wee and David Pierson (2025), “Ignoring Pleas, Thailand Deports Dozens of Uyghurs to China,” *New York Times* (February 27 2025)

[<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/27/world/asia/thailand-china-uyghurs.html>](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/27/world/asia/thailand-china-uyghurs.html).

¹⁵ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer (2021), “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach,” *Freedom House* [<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf>](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf).

states include what Human Rights Watch has termed “swap marts,” in which the governments of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand have cooperated to forcibly disappear targeted political exiles located in each other’s territory.¹⁵

Finally, host states may demonstrate a general disregard for how migrants are uniquely vulnerable to transnational repression, and may therefore cooperate with requests for extradition or expulsion when origin states claim such requests are meant to address seemingly non-political offenses. For example, in 2020 Austrian authorities deported Hizbullo Shovalizoda, an exiled Tajik activist who had sought asylum in Austria, to Tajikistan, where he was convicted of “extremism” and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The decision of Austrian authorities to extradite Shovalizoda was later invalidated by Austria’s Supreme Court.¹⁶

Outside of formal extraditions, it can be empirically difficult to identify when the enforced disappearance of a person in a migration context involves origin state action. Origin state requests for detention or return are often channeled through non-public means, such as diplomatic services, security agencies, or law enforcement institutions that lack transparency. Migrants themselves are often not informed about the reasons for their detention or return, including what if any role the origin state may have played. This underscores the importance of continuing research as well as pressure for improved transparency from institutions in both the host and origin states. Nonetheless, there is compelling evidence pointing to the involvement of host states in the politically motivated forced removal of migrants at the request of origin states.

IV. Factors Contributing to the Problem

Although this submission focuses on the problem of transnational repression, unlawful deportations and forced renditions of migrants do not occur in a vacuum. Global attitudes towards migrants are hardening, and states are adopting increasingly harsh migration enforcement measures. These trends are contributing to policy environments conducive to the enforced disappearance of migrants in the context of transnational repression. Three factors exemplify how host state actions are making the problem of transnational repression worse:

¹⁵ Human Rights Watch (2024), “We Thought We Were Safe, Repression and Forced Return of Refugees in Thailand,” *Human Rights Watch* (May 16 2024)

<<https://www.hrw.org/feature/2024/05/16/we-thought-we-were-safe/repression-and-forced-return-of-refugees-in-thailand>>.

¹⁶ RFE/RL’s Tajik Service (2020), “Austria’s Supreme Court Invalidates Extradition Of Tajik Activist,” *Radio Free Europe* (July 10 2020)

<<https://www.rferl.org/a/austria-s-supreme-court-invalidates-extradition-of-tajik-activist-now-sitting-in-dushanbe-jail/30719527.html>>.

anti-migrant policies, migrant-related data sharing among states, and inadequate resourcing for the processing of migrant cases.

a) Anti-migrant policies

It is becoming clear that many host states' policies on countering transnational repression, and their policies on restricting or eliminating migration, are in tension. Some states have acknowledged the importance of protecting political exiles and vulnerable diaspora members from the repressive tactics of origin states.¹⁷ Yet, many of these states' efforts to address transnational repression are fundamentally undermined by exclusionary and securitized migration controls which curtail the rights of migrants, and place migrants at greater risk of detention and forced removal. The mass migrant detention and expulsion policies of host states in particular can constitute purposeful violations of international human rights standards, which erode the broader framework of norms and laws that have been developed to protect migrants around the world. These violations in turn create conditions ripe for the enforced disappearance of migrants in the context of transnational repression.

Host states that pursue anti-migrant policies make it easier for origin states to manipulate their immigration systems to secure the forced return of targeted migrants. For example, in the United States, the Trump administration's anti-migrant policies involve widespread collective expulsions. In some cases, there are indications of a transnational repression element in these expulsions. When the US government deported dozens of Iranian citizens to Iran in fall 2025, some of those expelled were first visited in detention by Iranian officials, who were aware of elements of their asylum applications in the United States.¹⁸ These visits, which violated legal protections for the migrants, indicated origin state involvement in the expulsion. In January 2026, despite the government of Iran's violent crackdown on widespread public protests, US authorities again deported around a dozen Iranian citizens back to the country, reportedly as part of an agreement with Iranian authorities.¹⁹ Similarly, when US authorities collectively expelled dozens of Russian citizens in fall 2025, some were arrested upon their return to Russia, indicating that Russian authorities were aware of the migrants identity and sought to have them returned to Russia.

Placing migrants at greater risk of enforced disappearance are host state policies that provide for expedited removal processes for refugee claimants and asylum seekers who come from

¹⁷ G7 (2025), "G7 Leaders' Statement on Transnational Repression," *Government of Canada* <<https://g7.canada.ca/assets/ea689367/Attachments/NewItems/pdf/g7-summit-statements/transnational-en.pdf>>.

¹⁸ Author conversations with legal counsel for affected individuals, January 2026

¹⁹ Jennifer Hansler (2026), "Trump Admin Deports Iranians for First Time Since Brutal Crackdown on Protests," *CNN* (January 26 2026) <<https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/26/politics/trump-administration-deports-iranians>>.

designated “safe” origin countries, or who arrive in host states via designated “safe” third countries. Safe country designations are predicated on assessments that a particular country is generally safe, either as a country of origin or as a country of arrival. However, these assessments should be reevaluated in light of new information, including evidence that states are pursuing harsh anti-migrant policies or are implicated in transnational repression. For example, the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement designates the United States as a safe third country due to the Canadian government’s assessment that the US’ “refugee status determination system offers a high degree of protection to refugee protection claimants” and that “[t]he United States meets a high standard with respect to the protection of human rights.”²⁰ Canada has continued to adhere to this agreement, despite cases in which US authorities have facilitated the expulsion and enforced disappearance of Iranian and Russian migrants.

It also is worth noting that anti-migrant policies have broader impacts on victims of transnational repression, beyond those specifically targeted for unlawful deportation or forced rendition. Anti-migrant policies can discourage victims from reporting to local authorities, due to a fear that interacting with law enforcement could lead to their deportation due to their immigration status. Such policies can also effectively restrict migrants’ participation in the society of the host country, including their ability to safely access essential services such as medical care, schools, transportation, and food without facing the threat of detention and expulsion.²¹

b) Law enforcement data sharing among states

Law enforcement data sharing among states provide a further context in which host states may contribute to the forced return of migrants in the context of transnational repression. Origin states have accused political exiles and migrants of seemingly non-political criminal offenses, and have shared this information with other states in an effort to have these individuals detained and expelled. By accepting migrant-related data from origin states acting in bad faith, host states risk treating politically motivated criminal accusations as potential grounds for expulsion. For example, the government of Rwanda has provided law enforcement agencies in the United States with misleading or falsified “poison pen” information about the supposed criminal activities of Rwandan political exiles, in an effort to persuade United States authorities to investigate and ultimately deport these individuals.²²

²⁰ Government of Canada (2023), “Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement,” *Government of Canada* <<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/safe-third-country-agreement.html>>.

²¹ Charles Homans (2026), “Watching America Unravel in Minneapolis,” *New York Times* (January 25 2026) <<https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/25/magazine/minneapolis-trump-ice-protests-minnesota.html>>.

²² Carlos Mureithi and Kira Zalan (2022), “Rwanda Fed False Intelligence to U.S. and Interpol As It Pursued Political Dissidents Abroad,” *OCCRP* <<https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/rwanda-fed-false-intelligence-to-us-and-interpol-as-it-pursued-political-dissidents-abroad>>.

This phenomenon, whereby host states detain migrants based on falsified charges brought to them by perpetrating origin states, is at the root of the abuse of Interpol's notification system. Requests for notices submitted by member states are supposed to be vetted internally before they are disseminated to Interpol member countries' databases. Despite Interpol's Constitution prohibiting interventions "of a political, military, religious, or racial character"²³, Interpol's vetting system has on numerous occasions allowed such notices to go through. A noted example is the detention by Moroccan authorities of Idris Hasan, a Uyghur Chinese citizen charged by the government of the People's Republic of China with terrorism-related offenses. While the Red Notice against Idris Hasan was cancelled by Interpol months after it was issued in 2021, Moroccan authorities continued to detain him for three and a half years before releasing him in 2025 following years of appeals from overseas advocates.²⁴

Interpol represents a formidable black box for those at risk of transnational repression, due to the difficulty of obtaining information from Interpol before traveling. There is no complete public list of Red Notices, and subjects of Red Notices require specialized legal counsel in order to have an unjustified notice against them lifted. The fundamental human rights challenge with Interpol's operations is that the organization exists to serve its members, which are representatives of member states' law enforcement institutions, including institutions involved in transnational repression. Recent reports, based on thousands of leaked internal Interpol documents, indicate that many perpetrating origin states are among the most frequent sources of Red Notices.²⁵ Individuals sought through Interpol notices do not have adequate mechanisms for accountability or redress when those rights are violated by abuses or failures of the system.

We would also like to direct the Committee and the Working Group's attention to emerging data-related issues which may endanger migrants. As states securitize their efforts to restrict migration, they are adopting extensive data collection processes aimed at migrants inside or seeking to enter their borders, and embracing more elastic understandings of what information is needed to assess migrant cases. Technological advancements are making it easier for host states to collect biometric and digital data during migration-related processes, while anti-migrant policies are encouraging states to engage in more invasive data collection efforts. For example, in the United States immigration authorities are collecting DNA from migrant adults and children

²³ Interpol, "Legal Documents," *Interpol* <<https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents>>.

²⁴ Amnesty International (2025), "Morocco/Western Sahara: Further Information: Uyghur Activist Released from Moroccan Prison: Idris Hasan (Official Chinese Name: Yidiresi Aishan)," *Amnesty International* <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde29/9075/2025/en/>>.

²⁵ Mathieu Martinière, Robert Schmidt and Rémi Labed (2026), *Disclose* (January 26 2026) <<https://disclose.ngo/en/article/revelations-on-the-misuse-of-interpol-by-the-worlds-most-repressive-regimes>>.

held in detention²⁶, while the State Department has instructed applicants for certain classes of nonimmigrant visas to switch their social media accounts' privacy settings to "public" in order to screen them for potential "national security" threats.²⁷

Such practices, when combined with existing interstate migration-related data sharing mechanisms, have the potential to jeopardize the safety of migrants targeted for transnational repression. Perpetrating origin states have misused host state migration processes to have individuals investigated, detained, and expelled. States must be attentive to the risks posed by sharing sensitive biometric, digital, and biographic information on migrants with perpetrating origin states, or with host states which have a record of facilitating transnational repression via the unlawful deportation or forced rendition of migrants. We call the attention of the Committee and the Working Group to the importance of individuals' right to informational self-determination, or the right to access and control personal data in the possession of any public organ as elaborated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights²⁸, which is a crucial protection in the context of the collection and usage of migrant data by states.²⁹

c) Inadequate resourcing for the processing of migrant cases

Dysfunctional immigration systems create additional barriers for migrants facing forced removal in the context of transnational repression, even for states which have attempted to put in place safeguards to prevent the refoulement of vulnerable individuals. Rather than allocating resources, particularly for adequate staffing, to ensure migration cases are fairly adjudicated and that due process rights are upheld, host states are focusing on enforcement and detention, and in some cases pursuing expedited removal proceedings in lieu of judicial hearings on asylum applications.³⁰

²⁶ Stevie Glaberson, Emerald Tse, and Emily Tucker (2024), "How the United States Government is Abusing its Immigration Powers to Amass DNA for Future Policing," *Georgetown Law* <<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/publications/raiding-the-genome/>>.

²⁷ U.S. Department of State (2025), "Announcement of Expanded Screening and Vetting for Visa Applicants," *Office of the Spokesperson* <<https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/announcement-of-expanded-screening-and-vetting-for-visa-applicants>>.

²⁸ Karen Gullo and Veridiana Alimonti (2024), "In Historic Victory for Human Rights in Colombia, Inter-American Court Finds State Agencies Violated Human Rights of Lawyers Defending Activists," Electronic Frontier Foundation (April 3 2024) <<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/historic-victory-human-rights-colombia-inter-american-court-finds-state-agencies>>.

²⁹ Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2025), "The Impact of Digital Surveillance on Freedom of Expression in the Americas," paras. 176-177, <<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/vigilanciarelecidh.pdf>>.

³⁰ E. Tammy Kim (2025), "Inside Donald Trump's Attack on Immigration Courts," *The New Yorker* (October 23 2025) <<https://www.newyorker.com/inside-donald-trumps-attack-on-immigration-court>>.

Migrants seeking the right to remain in a host country depend on the rigorous and fair assessment of their cases. Individualized assessments are especially important in the case of migrants who are asylum seekers, political exiles, or otherwise vulnerable to transnational repression. If individualized risk assessments are not conducted, or if the findings of these assessments are ignored, vulnerable migrants may be expelled to perpetrating origin states on the basis of politicized charges that do not conform with the standards of international human rights law. For example, in 2023 German authorities extradited Abdullo Shamsiddin, a Tajik activist who had lived in Germany since 2009, after deeming that he had not promptly reregistered with migration authorities. Upon his return to Tajikistan, Shamsiddin was tried and convicted of "public calls to violent change of the constitutional order of Tajikistan" and sentenced to seven years in prison.³¹

Delays in processing immigration applications and asylum claims can create backlogs that keep vulnerable migrants in a legal limbo as they wait on the results of their applications. These long delays in processing applications in turn prevent migrants from travelling outside the host country. In cases where origin states have close ties with or leverage over host state authorities, the inability of migrants to freely travel beyond the host state places them at increased danger of being detained and unlawfully deported or forcibly removed.

Putting vulnerable migrants in further jeopardy is the lack of quality legal representation. Migrants are often unfamiliar with the legal system of the host country, including their rights under relevant national laws. Migrants are dependent on lawyers and other forms of professional legal assistance to navigate immigration and asylum systems. Without this assistance, migrants vulnerable to transnational repression are at greater risk of removal and enforced disappearance. Host state authorities involved in asylum processes and judicial proceedings may lack expertise on origin countries, leading them to overlook or downplay the dangers associated with returning someone to an origin state or third state, including states with a record of involvement in transnational repression. Without fair individualized assessments and proper legal representation for migrants, a host state's assurances that a returned individual will not be subject to ill-treatment are less likely to be properly interrogated.

V. Recommendations:

Based on the preceding analysis, we offer the following recommendations to host states:

³¹ RFE/RL's Tajik Service (2023), "Tajik Opposition Politician's Son Extradited From Germany Sentenced To Seven Years In Prison," *Radio Free Europe* (March 30 2023) <<https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-opposition-son-prison/32342184.html>>.

- Provide migrant victims of transnational repression with access to safe reporting channels, and ensure that using these channels will not result in negative impacts on their asylum status or asylum application.
- Screen migrants for vulnerability to transnational repression during immigration processes and provide migrants with rigorous individualized risk assessments, to ensure individuals vulnerable to enforced disappearance are not removed.
- Provide training to individuals involved in processing immigration and asylum cases to ensure they are able to recognize the forms transnational repression can take, including the manipulation of migration systems by authorities in origin states.
- Promote inter-agency cooperation among immigration and border authorities, law enforcement, and other relevant authorities, to ensure that information on transnational repression, including patterns of behaviour by perpetrating origin states, is shared.
- Allocate resources for judges, lawyers, and other offices involved in processing migrant cases, to ensure applications are adjudicated fairly and the rights of migrants are upheld.
- Provide migrants vulnerable to transnational repression and their family members with travel documents, visas, and residency permits, to reduce their reliance on travel documents provided by origin states and to allow them to remain in the host country.
- Take into account transnational repression practices when assessing the current or proposed designation of a state as a “safe origin country” and “safe third country.”
- Emphasize data minimization, purpose specification, and informational self-determination when collecting data from migrants.
- Avoid standardized migrant-related data sharing with origin states or third states in cases where migrants are at risk of transnational repression. Migrant-related data sharing must be conditional on the completion of rigorous individualized risk assessments which take into account the human rights record of the origin state or third state.
- Where forced returns have already occurred, and where enforced disappearances have been reported, provide victims’ relatives with legal and psychosocial assistance, consular support, and pathways for family reunification or humanitarian entry.