“Smart” in-store shopping carts, developed by Caper and used by Sobeys, issue electronic receipts via SMS message and share a URL that uses an easily predictable format. These receipts contain a number of personal data points, including the customer’s partial credit/debit/Air Miles card numbers, a full list of purchases, and the date, time, and location of the customer’s purchase.
The Citizen Lab, OutRight Action International, and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) collaborated to conduct research on LGBTIQ website censorship and its impact on LGBTIQ communities. The results indicate the technical and legal obstacles many users have in accessing LGBTIQ news, health, and human rights websites.
Tujuan dari penelitian kami adalah sebagai berikut. Mendokumentasikan situs web LGBTIQ mana yang diblokir di enam negara; Menyelidiki bagaimana penyensoran situs LGBTIQ berdampak pada komunitas LGBTIQ lokal dan gerakan mereka untuk mengamankan keadilan dan kesetaraan; dan
Menentukan bagaimana Penyedia Jasa Internet (ISP) lokal menerapkan pemblokiran situs web.
As part of the Citizen Lab’s research into the security and privacy of applications, we report on issues we discovered with three COVID-related applications in Indonesia and the Philippines – PeduliLindungi, StaySafe PH, and COVID-KAYA.
COVID-KAYA, a platform used by frontline healthcare workers in the Philippines to collect and share COVID-19 cases with the Philippines Department of Health, contained vulnerabilities in both the web and Android apps that allows for unauthorized users to access private data about the app’s users, and potentially patient data.
This annotated bibliography compiles and summarizes relevant literature on “digital transnational repression” (i.e., where states seek to exert pressure—using digital tools—on citizens living abroad in order to constrain, limit, or eliminate political or social action that threatens regime stability or social and cultural norms within the country). While transnational repression itself is not a new phenomenon, there has been limited research on how such repression is enabled and expanded by digital tools.
This submission outlines Canadian technology companies and the threat they pose to human rights abroad, as well as suggests mechanisms the Government of Canada’s RBC strategy can adopt to address the harmful impacts of Canadian-made technology.
This document provides a high-level introduction to deep packet inspection, Internet filtering, and targeted intrusion dual-use technologies with the aim of familizaring the reader with their key technical features, the surrounding international human rights law framework, and some of the leading research to date on their deployment.
Published by the Review of Policy Research, this paper by the Citizen Lab’s Ron Deibert, Joshua Oliver, and Adam Senft takes a deep dive into data provided by the circumvention tool Psiphon to reveal Iran’s increasingly sophisticated Internet blocking strategy around elections.
In this report, we describe how Canadian permanent resident and Saudi dissident Omar Abdulaziz was targeted with a fake package delivery notification. We assess with high confidence that Abdulaziz’s phone was infected with NSO’s Pegasus spyware. We attribute this infection to a Pegasus operator linked to Saudi Arabia.