Russia Breaks Into Human Rights Activist’s Phone With Cellebrite

We analyzed Russian activist Andrey Pivovarov’s phone, finding that Russian authorities used forensic extraction tools made by Cellebrite to gain access to his device. A document prepared by Russian authorities confirms that Cellebrite was used to extract information to aid in Pivovarov’s prosecution. Importantly, we found that authorities continued to use Cellebrite for political repression even after the company had cancelled its contracts with Russian customers.

June 25, 2026

(Un)forced Errors

Analysis of Proposed Surveillance Law Expansion under Bill C-22, An Act respecting lawful access

This submission analyzes Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, which would enact broad surveillance obligations and reforms in Canada. Issues include: the bill’s sweeping scope, significant constitutional and human rights risks, transparency and accountability deficits, and dangers to encryption and Canada’s cybersecurity. We recommend entirely withdrawing several elements of the bill and suggest amendments to mitigate harms. 

June 2, 2026

Tall Tales

How Chinese Actors Use Impersonation and Stolen Narratives to Perpetuate Digital Transnational Repression

In collaboration with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), we identified two distinct actors aligned with the People’s Republic of China that have been targeting and impersonating journalists and civil society. Our findings provide insight into the Chinese government’s practice of digital transnational repression and its shift to a system of state-sponsored attacks carried out by private contractors.

April 27, 2026