We consistently found that Bing censors politically sensitive Chinese names over time, that their censorship spans multiple Chinese political topics, consists of at least two languages—English and Chinese—and applies to different world regions, including China, the United States, and Canada.
The Citizen Lab, in collaboration with Catalan civil society groups, has identified at least 65 individuals targeted or infected with mercenary spyware, including members of the European Parliament, Catalan Presidents, legislators, jurists, and members of civil society organisations.
The IATA Travel Pass (ITP), a global, opt-in app to receive, store, and share digital COVID-19 test certificates for flights, has a critical flaw in its registration process which allows an attacker to impersonate another user, needing only to know the user’s passport details but not possess the passport itself.
Phones belonging to four Jordanian human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists were hacked with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware between August 2019 and December 2021. We assess that at least two of the four targets were hacked by Pegasus operators primarily focused on Jordan, based on SMS messages containing Pegasus links that map to a cluster of domain names focusing on Jordanian themes.
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, focusing on research and development at the intersection of information and communication technologies, human rights, and global security. Learn more.
In an exclusive with New Yorker’s Ronan Farrow, Citizen Lab researchers reveal the presence of Pegasus spyware on the phones of 65 activists, politicians, and civil society groups in Catalonia.
We confirm that in 2020 and 2021 we observed and notified the government of the United Kingdom of multiple suspected instances of Pegasus spyware infections within official UK networks, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
In an interview with Click Here, Citizen Lab research assistant Noura Al-Jizawi comments on her experience being targeted by surveillance technologies. She sheds light on how such technologies enhance oppressive regimes’ ability to order up “sophisticated subversion campaigns.”
A report by the Citizen Lab sheds light on how digital technologies have strengthened the ability of authoritarian regimes to suppress the work of dissident advocates abroad. Relying on a series of interviews with targets in Canada, the report investigates the political, legal, and psychosocial elements of digital transnational repression.
Citizen Lab researcher Bill Marczak discovered women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul’s phone had been hacked, unfolding several legal actions against the Israeli NSO Group.
These comments are meant to identify areas of data governance that need improvement with regards to the Government of Canada’s use of mobility data, and personal and anonymized information more generally, as well as the management of such information by private organisations.
We investigate how activists and dissidents living in Canada are impacted by digital transnational repression: the various ways that individuals continue to be harassed and targeted online by authoritarian governments, even after they leave their country of origin.
