We consistently found that Bing censors politically sensitive Chinese names over time, that their censorship spans multiple Chinese political topics, consists of at least two languages—English and Chinese—and applies to different world regions, including China, the United States, and Canada.
The Citizen Lab, in collaboration with Catalan civil society groups, has identified at least 65 individuals targeted or infected with mercenary spyware, including members of the European Parliament, Catalan Presidents, legislators, jurists, and members of civil society organisations.
The IATA Travel Pass (ITP), a global, opt-in app to receive, store, and share digital COVID-19 test certificates for flights, has a critical flaw in its registration process which allows an attacker to impersonate another user, needing only to know the user’s passport details but not possess the passport itself.
Phones belonging to four Jordanian human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists were hacked with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware between August 2019 and December 2021. We assess that at least two of the four targets were hacked by Pegasus operators primarily focused on Jordan, based on SMS messages containing Pegasus links that map to a cluster of domain names focusing on Jordanian themes.
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, focusing on research and development at the intersection of information and communication technologies, human rights, and global security. Learn more.
We confirm that in 2020 and 2021 we observed and notified the government of the United Kingdom of multiple suspected instances of Pegasus spyware infections within official UK networks, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
These comments are meant to identify areas of data governance that need improvement with regards to the Government of Canada’s use of mobility data, and personal and anonymized information more generally, as well as the management of such information by private organisations.
The Information Controls Fellowship Program from the Open Technology Fund (OTF) supports research into how governments in countries, regions, or areas of OTF’s core focus are restricting the free flow of information, cutting access to the open Internet, and implementing censorship mechanisms, thereby threatening the ability of global citizens to exercise basic human rights and democracy; work focused on mitigation of such threats is also supported.
Donations to this scholarship will support a University of Toronto student who successfully completes the POL106H course, Contemporary Challenges to Democracy: Democracy in the Social Media Age, in the current academic year. Special consideration will be given to applications from Black or Indigenous students.
El Citizen Lab y Access Now han confirmado 35 casos de periodistas y miembros de la sociedad civil salvadoreña cuyos teléfonos fueron infectados con el programa espía Pegasus del NSO entre julio del 2020 y noviembre del 2021. Hemos compartido una muestra de nuestros datos forenses con el Laboratorio de Seguridad de Amnistía Internacional, el cual confirma de forma independiente los hallazgos.
In this report, we introduce the design of GFWatch, a large-scale longitudinal measurement platform that informs the public about how GFW censorship changes over time and its negative impact on the free flow of information.
We investigate how activists and dissidents living in Canada are impacted by digital transnational repression: the various ways that individuals continue to be harassed and targeted online by authoritarian governments, even after they leave their country of origin.
