The Citizen Lab, in collaboration with Catalan civil society groups, has identified at least 65 individuals targeted or infected with mercenary spyware, including members of the European Parliament, Catalan Presidents, legislators, jurists, and members of civil society organisations.
We confirm that in 2020 and 2021 we observed and notified the government of the United Kingdom of multiple suspected instances of Pegasus spyware infections within official UK networks, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The IATA Travel Pass (ITP), a global, opt-in app to receive, store, and share digital COVID-19 test certificates for flights, has a critical flaw in its registration process which allows an attacker to impersonate another user, needing only to know the user’s passport details but not possess the passport itself.
On April 13, the Citizen Lab published an analysis of the IATA Travel Pass. In this post, we discuss the significance of the report’s findings.
In an interview with Click Here, Citizen Lab research assistant Noura Al-Jizawi comments on her experience being targeted by surveillance technologies. She sheds light on how such technologies enhance oppressive regimes’ ability to order up “sophisticated subversion campaigns.”
النتائج الرئيسية تم اختراق أجهزة أربعة مدافعين عن حقوق الإنسان، محاميين، وصحفيين أردنيين بواسطة برنامج التجسس بيغاسوس من مجموعة NSO في الفترة ما بين أغسطس 2019 و ديسمبر 2021. من ضمن المستهدفيين أفراد ناشطون في قضايا مكافحة الفساد في الأردن. اثنان من الأفراد المستهدفين نساء. نقدر أن اثنين على الأقل من المستهدفين الأربعة قد تم… Read more »
Phones belonging to four Jordanian human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists were hacked with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware between August 2019 and December 2021. We assess that at least two of the four targets were hacked by Pegasus operators primarily focused on Jordan, based on SMS messages containing Pegasus links that map to a cluster of domain names focusing on Jordanian themes.
自我們的初次報告以來，我們發現蘋果公司已經停止了在台灣進行針對中國政治敏感內容的審查。然而，盡管人權組織建議美國公司抵制內容審查，蘋果公司仍然繼續在中國大陸以外的香港地區進行廣泛的、基于關鍵詞的政治審查。
自我们的初次报告以来，我们发现苹果公司已经停止了在台湾进行针对中国政治敏感内容的审查。然而，尽管人权组织建议美国公司抵制内容审查，苹果公司仍然继续在中国大陆以外的香港地区进行广泛的、基于关键词的政治审查。
Since our report in August 2021, we find that Apple has eliminated their Chinese political censorship in Taiwan. However, Apple continues to perform broad, keyword-based political censorship outside of mainland China in Hong Kong, despite human rights groups’ recommendations for American companies to resist blocking content.
