Regulating Transnational Dissident Cyber Espionage

Siena Anstis, senior legal advisor at the Citizen Lab, highlights the urgent need for an international treaty to tackle digital transnational repression in her article “Regulating Transnational Dissident Cyber Espionage,” published by the Cambridge University Press’ journal International and Comparative Law.  In the article, Anstis argues that the absence of an international law to prevent… Read more »

Assistant Professor, Information Security [CLOSED]

The Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy in the Faculty of Arts & Science at the University of Toronto invites applications for a full-time tenure stream position in the area of Information Security. The appointment will be at the rank of Assistant Professor, with an expected start date of July 1, 2024, or… Read more »

Spyware Targeting Against Serbian Civil Society

We confirm that two members of Serbian civil society were targeted with spyware earlier this year. Both have publicly criticized the Serbian government. We are not naming the individuals at this time by their request. The Citizen Lab’s technical analysis of forensic artifacts was conducted in support of an investigation led by Access Now in collaboration with the SHARE Foundation. Researchers from Amnesty International independently analyzed the cases and their conclusions match our findings.

Submission to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security: Charter analysis concerning cybersecurity and telecommunications reform in Bill C-26

On June 14, 2022, Bill C-26, an Act respecting cybersecurity, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts, was introduced into Parliament for the first reading by Canada’s Minister of Public Safety, Marco Mendicino. Hearings on Bill C-26 are scheduled to begin in SECU (the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Safety and… Read more »

Chinese censorship following the death of Li Keqiang

As part of our ongoing project monitoring changes to Chinese search censorship, we tracked changes to censorship following Li Keqiang’s death across seven Internet platforms: Baidu, Baidu Zhidao, Bilibili, Microsoft Bing, Jingdong, Sogou, and Weibo. We found that some keyword combinations in search queries triggers hard censorship whereas others trigger soft censorship. Our results demonstrate China’s ongoing efforts to push state-sanctioned narratives concerning politically sensitive topics, impacting the integrity of the online information environment.

Finding You: The Network Effect of Telecommunications Vulnerabilities for Location Disclosure

This report provides a comprehensive guide to geolocation-related threats sourced from 3G, 4G, and 5G network operators. Case studies, references, examples, and evidence are provided to give a complete and contextual understanding of mobile network-based location tracking in order to formulate policies and actions that protect civil society from current and future geolocation surveillance.

PREDATOR في الاتصالات: أحمد الطنطاوي مستهدف ببرنامج التجسس Predator بعد الإعلان عن نيته للترشح للرئاسة

بين شهري مايو وسبتمبر 2023، استُهدِف عضو البرلمان المصري السابق أحمد الطنطاوي ببرنامج التجسس Predator من Cytrox عبر روابط أُرسلت إليه عبر رسائل قصيرة و رسائل WhatsApp. وقع الاستهداف بعد أن صرح الطنطاوي علنًا بخطته للترشح لمنصب الرئاسة في الانتخابات المصرية لعام 2024.

Independently Confirming Amnesty Security Lab’s finding of Predator targeting of U.S. & other elected officials on Twitter/X

Amnesty International’s Security Lab has just published Caught in the Net as part of the European Investigative Collaborations‘ Predator Files, which details a threat actor sending what they assess to be Predator infection links on social media in replies to Twitter / X posts by officials, journalists and other members of civil society. The Citizen… Read more »

PREDATOR IN THE WIRES: Ahmed Eltantawy Targeted with Predator Spyware After Announcing Presidential Ambitions

Between May and September 2023, former Egyptian MP Ahmed Eltantawy was targeted with Cytrox’s Predator spyware via links sent on SMS and WhatsApp after Eltantawy publicly stated his plans to run for President in the 2024 Egyptian elections. As Egypt is a known customer of Cytrox’s Predator spyware, and the spyware was delivered via network injection from a device located physically inside Egypt, we attribute the attack to the Egyptian government with high confidence.