China’s DeepSeek AI chatbot has raised serious privacy concerns. Speaking with Kevin Collier at NBC News, The Citizen Lab’s director, Ron Deibert, remarks that the privacy problems regarding DeepSeek are not limited to Chinese platforms, and that personal information is also used by U.S. artificial intelligence platforms. Read the article here.
This profile is part of the Citizen Lab’s research on digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and silence exiled dissidents and diaspora communities. It is part of the broader practice of transnational repression, which refers to states using methods such as harassment, coercion-by-proxy, kidnapping, and assassination… Read more »
This country spotlight is part of the Citizen Lab’s research on digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and silence exiled dissidents and diaspora communities. It is part of the broader practice of transnational repression, which refers to states using methods such as harassment, coercion-by-proxy, kidnapping, and… Read more »
Emile Dirks, Research Associate at the Citizen Lab, prepared a written submission for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) about the state of human rights in the country. The CECC was established by Congress in October 2000, with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China,… Read more »
We discovered over 60,000 unique censorship rules used to partially or totally censor search results across eight China-accessible search platforms analyzed. These findings call into question the ability of non-Chinese technology companies to better resist censorship demands than their Chinese counterparts.
We discovered over 60,000 unique censorship rules used to partially or totally censor search results across eight China-accessible search platforms analyzed. These findings call into question the ability of non-Chinese technology companies to better resist censorship demands than their Chinese counterparts.
Citizen Lab researchers find several encryption vulnerabilities on China’s mandatory app for Olympic athletes, MY2022.
In this report, we introduce the design of GFWatch, a large-scale longitudinal measurement platform that informs the public about how GFW censorship changes over time and its negative impact on the free flow of information.
On March 22, 2021, Citizen Lab research associate Christopher Parsons appeared before the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations to testify about issues of national security, governance, and trust with regards to Chinese companies and their technical products and services.
In their reporting on how China handled the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, the New York Times cites Citizen Lab research that outlines information controls on Chinese social media during the outbreak.
