Jeffrey Knockel
Articles
Engrave Danger: An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions
Within mainland China, we found that Apple censors political content including broad references to Chinese leadership and China’s political system, names of dissidents and independent news organizations, and general terms relating to religions, democracy, and human rights. And across all six regions, we found that Apple’s content moderation practices pertaining to derogatory, racist, or sexual content are inconsistently applied and that Apple’s public-facing documents failed to explain how it derives their keyword lists.
Unmasked II: An Analysis of Indonesia and the Philippines’ Government-launched COVID-19 Apps
As part of the Citizen Lab’s research into the security and privacy of applications, we report on issues we discovered with three COVID-related applications in Indonesia and the Philippines – PeduliLindungi, StaySafe PH, and COVID-KAYA.
Unmasked: COVID-KAYA and the Exposure of Healthcare Worker Data in the Philippines
COVID-KAYA, a platform used by frontline healthcare workers in the Philippines to collect and share COVID-19 cases with the Philippines Department of Health, contained vulnerabilities in both the web and Android apps that allows for unauthorized users to access private data about the app’s users, and potentially patient data.
Censored Contagion II: A Timeline of Information Control on Chinese Social Media During COVID-19
As a follow-up to our March 2020 report, we conducted daily tests on WeChat and collected 2,174 censored keywords between January to May 2020. This data provides a view into how narratives and messaging on the pandemic are controlled and molded on social media in China.
We Chat, They Watch: How International Users Unwittingly Build up WeChat’s Chinese Censorship Apparatus
WeChat communications conducted entirely among non-China-registered accounts are subject to pervasive content surveillance that was previously thought to be exclusively reserved for China-registered accounts.
Censored Contagion: How Information on the Coronavirus is Managed on Chinese Social Media
The analysis of YY and WeChat indicates broad censorship—blocking sensitive terms as well as general information and neutral references—potentially limiting the public’s ability to access information that may be essential to their health and safety.
“未阅先焚” 2: 微信如何实现实时审查用户对话中的敏感图片
本报告延续上一篇针对微信朋友圈图片过滤技术的研究,分析微信如何在聊天功能中实现实时图片过滤。微信是中国腾讯控股有限公司旗下的即时通讯应用,目前是中国最受欢迎的聊天软件之一,也是全球排名第四的最流行聊天软件。朋友圈是微信上最常用的功能之一,其中图片是用户最期望看到的内容分享形式。
(Can’t) Picture This 2: An Analysis of WeChat’s Realtime Image Filtering in Chats
In this work, we study how Tencent implements image filtering on WeChat. We found that Tencent implements realtime, automatic censorship of chat images on WeChat based on what text is in an image and based on an image’s visual similarity to those on a blacklist. Tencent facilitates this realtime filtering by maintaining a hash index of MD5 hashes of sensitive image files.
The Predator in Your Pocket: A Multidisciplinary Assessment of the Stalkerware Application Industry
This report was collaboratively written by researchers from computer science, political science, criminology, law, and journalism studies. As befits their expertise, the report is divided into several parts, with each focusing on specific aspects of the consumer spyware ecosystem, which includes: technical elements associated stalkerware applications, stalkerware companies’ marketing activities and public policies, and these companies’ compliance with Canadian federal commercial privacy legislation.