On June 3, 2025, the Canadian government tabled Bill C-2, omnibus legislation that, if passed, would introduce a wide array of new federal agency and law enforcement powers, and would significantly reform substantive and due process laws in Canada for migrants and asylum seekers. Our preliminary analysis of Bill C-2 situates the legislation within the context of existing research by the Citizen Lab about two potential data-sharing treaties that are most relevant to the new proposed powers being introduced in Bill C-2: the Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention (2AP) and the CLOUD Act. Both of which carry significant constitutional and human rights risks.

Un’introduzione a Paragon Solutions. Paragon Solutions è stata fondata in Israele nel 2019 e vende uno spyware chiamato Graphite. L’azienda si descrive come diversa dagli altri produttori, affermando di disporre di salvaguardie per prevenire i tipi di abusi di spyware per cui NSO Group e altri fornitori sono noti. Analisi dell’infrastruttura dello spyware Paragon. Sulla… Read more »

In our first investigation into Israel-based spyware company, Paragon Solutions, we begin to untangle multiple threads connected to the proliferation of Paragon’s mercenary spyware operations across the globe. This report includes an infrastructure analysis of Paragon’s spyware product, called Graphite; a forensic analysis of infected devices belonging to members of civil society; and a closer look at the use of Paragon spyware in both Canada and Italy.

Legal researchers Cynthia Khoo and Kate Robertson warn that a Canada-U.S. CLOUD agreement would extend the reach of U.S. law enforcement into Canada’s digital terrain to an unprecedented extent, and that if signed, this agreement would effectively allow U.S. police to demand personal data directly from any provider of an “electronic communication service” or “remote computing service” in Canada, so long as it had some ties to the U.S.

On June 14, 2022, Bill C-26, an Act respecting cybersecurity, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts, was introduced into Parliament for the first reading by Canada’s Minister of Public Safety, Marco Mendicino. Hearings on Bill C-26 are scheduled to begin in SECU (the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Safety and… Read more »

Algorithmic policing technologies, including facial recognition, have arrived or are coming to Canadian cities and provinces, and they are doing so quickly. We have identified a number of significant policy, practice, and legal deficits related to the use of algorithmic policing technologies in Canada, including imminent or foreseeable impacts to human rights and fundamental freedoms including the rights to privacy, liberty, and equality, expressive and associational freedoms, and others.

In order to contribute to the IPC’s deliberations in the triaging of its strategic priorities, this submission serves to provide particularized input with respect to the IPC’s public interest mandate in the oversight of law enforcement authorities when it comes to the use of algorithmic policing technology in Ontario.

This report examines algorithmic technologies that are designed for use in criminal law enforcement systems, including a human rights and constitutional law analysis of the potential use of algorithmic policing technologies.

This report provides an in-depth legal and policy analysis of technology-facilitated intimate partner surveillance (IPS) under Canadian law. Stalkerware apps are designed to facilitate remote surveillance of an individual’s mobile device use with the surveillance often being covert or advertised as such. Despite increasing recognition of the prevalence of technology-enabled intimate partner abuse and harassment, the legality of the creation, sale, and use of consumer-level spyware apps has not yet been closely considered by Canadian courts, legislators, or regulators.