We consistently found that Bing censors politically sensitive Chinese names over time, that their censorship spans multiple Chinese political topics, consists of at least two languages—English and Chinese—and applies to different world regions, including China, the United States, and Canada.

本報告研究微軟必應自動建議功能（autosuggestion）針對人名的審查。我們發現，除了審查與色情相關的人名，第二大被微軟必應審查的人名類別是與中國領導人，異議人士相關以及其他在中國被認為是政治敏感的人名。

本报告研究微软必应自动建议功能（autosuggestion）针对人名的审查。我们发现，除了审查与色情相关的人名，第二大被微软必应审查的人名类别是与中国领导人，异议人士相关以及其他在中国被认为是政治敏感的人名。

自我們的初次報告以來，我們發現蘋果公司已經停止了在台灣進行針對中國政治敏感內容的審查。然而，盡管人權組織建議美國公司抵制內容審查，蘋果公司仍然繼續在中國大陸以外的香港地區進行廣泛的、基于關鍵詞的政治審查。

自我们的初次报告以来，我们发现苹果公司已经停止了在台湾进行针对中国政治敏感内容的审查。然而，尽管人权组织建议美国公司抵制内容审查，苹果公司仍然继续在中国大陆以外的香港地区进行广泛的、基于关键词的政治审查。

Since our report in August 2021, we find that Apple has eliminated their Chinese political censorship in Taiwan. However, Apple continues to perform broad, keyword-based political censorship outside of mainland China in Hong Kong, despite human rights groups’ recommendations for American companies to resist blocking content.

本报告研究苹果公司对其激光镌刻服务的内容仲裁和审核。苹果为AirTag和iPad等产品提供镌刻服务，让用户可以在产品上留下自定义信息

本報告研究蘋果公司對其雷射鐫刻服務的內容審查。蘋果為 AirTag 和 iPad 等產品提供鐫刻服務，讓用戶可以在產品上留下自訂訊息。

Within mainland China, we found that Apple censors political content including broad references to Chinese leadership and China’s political system, names of dissidents and independent news organizations, and general terms relating to religions, democracy, and human rights. And across all six regions, we found that Apple’s content moderation practices pertaining to derogatory, racist, or sexual content are inconsistently applied and that Apple’s public-facing documents failed to explain how it derives their keyword lists.

WeChat communications conducted entirely among non-China-registered accounts are subject to pervasive content surveillance that was previously thought to be exclusively reserved for China-registered accounts.