ResearchTargeted ThreatsDigital Transnational Repression

Turkey

This country spotlight is part of the Citizen Lab’s research on digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and silence exiled dissidents and diaspora communities. It is part of the broader practice of transnational repression, which refers to states using methods such as harassment, coercion-by-proxy, kidnapping, and assassination attempts, in order to control dissent outside their territories. Further research by the Citizen Lab on this issue – including research reports, country spotlights, stories of digital transnational repression, video interviews, and academic articles – is available here .

The Turkish government is a prolific perpetrator of transnational repression. In Freedom House’s dataset of physical incidents of transnational repression, Turkey currently ranks second after China among all countries engaging in repression against exiles and diaspora communities.1 The Turkish state has used methods of transnational repression since the 1990s and 2000s when it went after Kurdish movement activists living abroad. Attempts to control opponents in other countries increased during the 2013 Gezi Park protests which mobilized sections of Turkey’s large diaspora. Yet, its reliance on transnational repression spiked dramatically after a failed coup attempt in 2016. Since then, the government of President Erdogan has engaged in a global and systematic campaign to persecute members of the Gülen movement, who were accused of orchestrating the coup, and other perceived enemies.2

Turkey’s practice of transnational repression is remarkable for its reliance on renditions. Other effective methods include Interpol abuse, assault, and threats against relatives in Turkey.3 Exiled journalists and Erdogan critics in Germany and the Netherlands have received death threats or been physically attacked; some received police protection. As President Erdogan tightened his rule, the Turkish state has further expanded its capacities to control and surveil the diaspora. The government relies on a number of organizations to cultivate diaspora support and mobilize loyalist groups for its political agenda.4 Imams affiliated with the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), for instance, an umbrella organization linked to the government that oversees mosques in several European countries, spied on the opposition.5 Encouraged by Erdogan’s divisive rhetoric which casts dissidents and members of religious and ethnic minorities as outsiders, nationalist right-wing groups in the diaspora often intimidate and threaten critics, sometimes on their own and sometimes in coordination with Turkish officials.6

In addition to physical threats, the Turkish government relies on a number of digital tactics to intimidate, harass and silence dissidents, journalists and other critics in the diaspora. A common method is to mobilize troll networks affiliated with the ruling AKP party to systematically threaten opposition voices on social media platforms. An army of thousands of partisan trolls who regularly interfere in online debates grew gradually after the Gezi protests.7 The regime has reportedly used automated bot accounts, retweet rings, and inauthentic accounts to spread disinformation and attack opponents on platforms such as X (and previously Twitter).8 Moreover, social media groups and networks such as the pro-regime group “Osmanische Generation” based in Germany and TikTok channels led by pro-AKP influencers spread and promote propaganda and disinformation to the diaspora.9

Another method of digital transnational repression is the promotion of widespread surveillance-by-proxy among the diaspora. In 2016, Turkish authorities even introduced the app “EGM Mobil” (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, EGM) to facilitate the reporting of anti-regime behavior to domestic security agencies. The app allowed users to upload photos and contact details of alleged dissidents. Anyone who was reported became at-risk of arrest and interrogation upon their return to Turkey.10 Several of our respondents mentioned the fear of being denounced by others through a simple online report. “Suddenly the state has all the information on you, just because of a post or story. It seems they have all the means to surveil us,” explained a young German woman of Kurdish origin who regularly posted about Turkish politics.

These tactics are also used to target women activists and journalists in the diaspora. Online harassment, trolling, and bullying on social media often contain sexualized violence against women, from slurs and sexist comments to rape threats. Such misogyny aligns with the ideological pillars of the regime which has tied the promotion of a pious conservative lifestyle to the defense of the Turkish nation and Islam. Under Erdogan’s paternalistic rule, women’s rights have been further restricted, whereas violence against women who transgress traditional gender hierarchies increased.11 Online assailants typically reproduce domestic strategies of masculine domination over outspoken women by calling diaspora journalists and activists a “whore (orospu)” and other insults, often undergirded by detailed descriptions of sexual violence.

Our interviews showed that in particular women from ethnic and religious minorities, such as Kurds, Christians, and Alevis were exposed to a combination of racist tropes and violent rape and death threats. In addition, members of the LGBTQ+ communities described how sexual and gender-based violence intersected in the form of transphobic hate online. Some of our study participants reported that attacks occurred in waves, suspecting some form of coordination. However, the targeted women often remained unsure about the direct involvement of state-affiliated actors.

As such, gendered digital transnational repression in the Turkish context often seems to work through threats and intimidation on social media from other diaspora members who are supportive of the government, without being explicitly directed by any state institution. A civil society activist described how her criticism of President Erdogan on German public television triggered a wave of online harassment and abuse from government supporters. A Kurdish activist who wrote a long post about her family’s history of oppression was confronted with hundreds of hateful and violent comments, some in direct messages on Instagram. A journalist reporting on minority and women’s rights said that her father’s social media profile was tagged in some of the sexual insults she received on the platform which strained her relationship with him. She also received threats of assault, mentioning details about her and her parents’ whereabouts.

The diffuse hostility from men replicating the Turkish government’s chauvinist discourse severely affected the psychosocial well-being of targets. Because most aggressors had a diaspora background, the respondents explained that they no longer felt safe in their own neighborhood and community. They experienced fear and mistrust in their daily relations with other diaspora members, reduced their social ties, and used digital tools with caution. The journalist mentioned above explained that she had “lost interest and fun” in using social media, stressing that many women who experienced these threats limited or withdrew from engaging in activism activities. “I am not an exception,” she said, “this is very worrisome.”


  1. Yana Gorokhovskaia, Nate Schenkkan, and Grady Vaughan (2023), “Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022,” Freedom House <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/FH_TransnationalRepression2023_0.pdf>.↩︎

  2. Ahmet Erdi Öztürk and Hakkı Taş (2020), “The Repertoire of Extraterritorial Repression: Diasporas and Home States,” Migration Letters 17(1).↩︎

  3. Freedom House (2021), “Turkey: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study,” <https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/turkey>.↩︎

  4. Bahar Baser and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (2021), “Positive and Negative Diaspora Governance in Context: From Public Diplomacy to Transnational Authoritarianism,” In Erdoğan’s Turkey, Ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (Routledge).↩︎

  5. Chase Winter (2017), “Turkish Iman Spy Affair in Germany Extends Across Europe,” DW (February 16) <https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-imam-spy-affair-in-germany-extends-across-europe/a-37590672>.↩︎

  6. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Erdoan Shipoli, and Ahmet Dogru (2023), “Transnational

    Securitization and Violence: The Discursive Mechanism Behind the Pro-AKP Diaspora’s

    Repression of the Dissident Diaspora Groups in the West,” Democratization 30(3).↩︎

  7. Nathan Kohlenberg (2023), “The Tweet is Coming from Inside the House,” Alliance for Securing Democracy (May 11) <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/the-tweet-is-coming-from-inside-the-house>; Ihsan Yilmaz and Bulent Kenes (2023), “Digital Authoritariansm in Turkish Cyberspace: A Study of Deception and Disinformation by the AKP Regime’s AKtrolls and AKbots,” Populism & Politics <https://www.populismstudies.org/digital-authoritarianism-in-turkish-cyberspace-a-study-of-deception-and-disinformation-by-the-akp-regimes-aktrolls-and-akbots/>.↩︎

  8. Shelby Grossman, Fazil Alp Akis, Ayça Alemdaroğlu, Josh A. Goldstein, and Katie Jonsson (2020), “Political Retweet Rings and Compromised Accounts: A Twitter Influence Operation Linked to the Youth Wing of Turkey’s Ruling Party,” Stanford Internet Observatory <https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:vw345qt9750/20200611_turkey_report.pdf>.↩︎

  9. Susan Djahangard and Katrin Elger (2017), “Erdogan’s Facebook Haters [in German],” Spiegel Online (April 3) <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/facebook-seiten-von-erdogan-fans-mitanlaufindiefresse-a-1141468.html>.↩︎

  10. Joseph Fitsanakis (2019), “Turkish Spy Agency Develops Phone App to Help Expats Inform on Dissidents,” Intelnews (June 10) <https://intelnews.org/2019/06/10/01-2565/>.↩︎

  11. Deniz Kandiyoti (2016), “Locating the Politics of Gender: Patriarchy, Neo-liberal Governance and Violence in Turkey,” Research and Policy on Turkey 1(2).↩︎