Citizen Lab researchers alert pro-independence individuals were targeted in a “possible case of domestic political espionage.”

Titled Reset: Reclaiming the Internet for Civil Society, the five lectures will be delivered online, streamed on CBC Radio’s IDEAS, and published as a book by House of Anansi Press in September.

The encroachments to OTF highlight why independent and transparent funding sources for research and development on Internet freedom are so important. Providing this type of support within a large government organisation can be difficult. OTF was an example of how to do that right. Losing that example will be a loss not only to the practitioners and researchers that have grown through the support of OTF but the wider community of marginalized people they support. 

Targets were sent emails disguised as important communications, such as official summonses, bearing links to malicious software disguised as important documents. If opened, targets’ computers would have been infected with NetWire, a piece of commodity malware.

In order to build up its censorship algorithm, WeChat surveils international accounts to decide what gets through to China-registered users. A Citizen Lab study finds that the messaging app blacklisted more than 500 keyword combinations relating to the COVID-19 pandemic.

On May 7 2020, the Citizen Lab published a report that documents how WeChat (the most popular social app in China) conducts surveillance of images and files shared on the platform and uses the monitored content to train censorship algorithms. This document provides a summary of the research findings and questions and answers from the research team.

In what follows, I first provide a summary of the Citizen Lab’s recent investigation into the security of Zoom’s video conferencing application, and the company’s responses. I then discuss a broader range of digital security risks that are relevant to the work-from-home routines that MPs and their staff are following. Finally, I conclude with six recommendations.

In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, experts have witnessed a rise in the number of disinformation and cyber espionage campaigns emerging from state actors, including Russia and China

發佈之後，我們的報告收到來自媒體、公眾和 Zoom 公司的廣泛迴響。本文件提供了一些常見疑問的解答，並回應外界對我們研究的錯誤解讀。

Since publishing report on Zoom security issues, there have been a wide range of responses to our research from the media, public, and Zoom itself. This document provides answers to frequently asked questions and addresses some inaccurate framings of our research.