Targeted Threats
Investigations into the prevalence and impact of digital espionage operations against civil society groups. For our research on Digital Transnational Repression, visit this page to explore our reports, media mentions, and resources.
Featured in Targeted Threats
Digital Transnational Repression Explained
Citizen Lab produced an animated explainer video on digital transnational repression in Canada that also highlight some of the stories of the interviewees while also protecting their identities.
Latest Research
PREDATOR IN THE WIRES: Ahmed Eltantawy Targeted with Predator Spyware After Announcing Presidential Ambitions
Between May and September 2023, former Egyptian MP Ahmed Eltantawy was targeted with Cytrox’s Predator spyware via links sent on SMS and WhatsApp after Eltantawy publicly stated his plans to run for President in the 2024 Egyptian elections. As Egypt is a known customer of Cytrox’s Predator spyware, and the spyware was delivered via network injection from a device located physically inside Egypt, we attribute the attack to the Egyptian government with high confidence.
HKLEAKS Doxxing Explained: Role of Online Harassment Tactics to Repress 2019 Hong Kong Protests
Read the full report “Beautiful Bauhinia: “HKLeaks” – The Use of Covert and Overt Online Harassment Tactics to Repress 2019 Hong Kong Protests.” What is this report about, and what did it find? The report is an in-depth analysis of the doxxing campaign known as “HKLEAKS”, which began in August 2019 and for at least… Read more »
Beautiful Bauhinia: “HKLeaks” – The Use of Covert and Overt Online Harassment Tactics to Repress 2019 Hong Kong Protests
In August 2019 a wave of websites and social media channels, called “HKLEAKS,” began “doxxing” the identities and personal information of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. While the creators of these sites and channels claimed that HKLEAKS was the product of local volunteer communities, several indicators suggest a coordinated information operation conducted by professional actors in alignment with Chinese state interests.
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: Pegasus infections – Technical Brief [1]
We identified widespread Pegasus spyware infections within Armenian civil society. We also identified two suspected Pegasus operators in Azerbaijan, whom we call BOZBASH and YANAR.
Triple Threat: NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware Returns in 2022 with a Trio of iOS 15 and iOS 16 Zero-Click Exploit Chains
In 2022, the Citizen Lab gained extensive forensic visibility into new NSO Group exploit activity after finding infections among members of Mexico’s civil society, including two human rights defenders from Centro PRODH, which represents victims of military abuses in Mexico.