In this report we provide the first systematic study of keyword and website censorship on WeChat, the most popular chat app in China
Search Results for: tencent
In this report we analyze Windows and Android versions of web browser UC Browser, and find they transmitted personally identifiable information with easily decryptable encryption and were vulnerable to arbitrary code execution during software updates
This report describes privacy and security issues with the Windows and Android versions of QQ Browser. Our research shows that both versions of the application transmit personally identifiable data without encryption or with easily decrypted encryption, and do not adequately protect the software update process.
A new report from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab identifies security and privacy issues in QQ Browser, a mobile browser produced by China-based Internet giant Tencent, which may put many millions of users of the application at risk of serious compromise.
This report is an analysis of the types of content removed by WeChat on its public accounts (also known as “official accounts”) blogging platform.
This post describes our analysis of China’s “Great Cannon,” our term for an attack tool that we identify as separate from, but co-located with, the Great Firewall of China. The first known usage of the Great Cannon is in the recent large-scale novel DDoS attack on both GitHub and servers used by GreatFire.org.
Slate’s discussion on the proliferation of Chinese messaging applications worldwide was informed by Citizen Lab research report “Asia Chats: Analyzing Information Controls & Privacy in Asian Messaging Applications.”
Contained are links to a set of 9,054 sensitive Chinese keywords, which combine 13 existing lists. These keywords may be helpful to researchers who are searching for censored content in Chinese or testing for network interference.
In this post we report updates on how LINE, KakaoTalk, OneDrive and Flickr are being disrupted in China. We find that Flickr and OneDrive remain consistently blocked, but LINE and KakaoTalk show inconsistent fluctuation between accessibility and inaccessibility. We also analyze security and privacy of FireChat and test accessibility of the service in China.
We analyze a newly discovered Android implant that we attribute to Hacking Team and highlight the political subtext of the bait content and attack context. In addition, we expose the functionality and architecture of Hacking Team’s Remote Control system and operator tradecraft in never-before published detail.