WeChat and Sina Weibo adapted and evolved their censorship efforts in response to the death of Liu Xiaobo.

NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware and exploit framework were used in infection attempts against Mexican senators and senior politicians in June and July 2016.

Uncovering an operation using NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware and Trident exploit framework to target Mexican journalists, lawyers, and even a minor child.

This report describes an espionage operation using government-exclusive spyware to target Mexican government food scientists and two public health advocates.

Citizen Lab Researcher Lotus Ruan was interviewed by VOA Mandarin on the recent release of the report entitled “One App Two Systems, How WeChat uses one censorship policy in China and another internationally.”

In this report we provide the first systematic study of keyword and website censorship on WeChat, the most popular chat app in China

This report describes a malware operation against the Syrian Opposition. We name the operator Group5, and suspect they have not been previously-reported. Group5 used “just enough” technical sophistication, combined with social engineering, to target computers and mobile phones with malware.

In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.

This report is an analysis of the types of content removed by WeChat on its public accounts (also known as “official accounts”) blogging platform.