Since 2012, the Citizen Lab with the support of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has been working on building bridges between researchers and activists in the global North and South to form a space of peers for collaboration and organization at local, regional, and international levels. The following is a review of major outcomes in advocacy, litigation and public policy in 2013.
The Open Technology Fund (OTF) with Citizen Lab announced the launch of the Information Controls Fellowship Program (ICFP).
In this report, we update the results of our June 2014 network measurement tests in Iraq in reaction to the ongoing insurgency in the country, and analyze two mobile applications, FireChat and Dawn of Glad Tidings.
In this post we report updates on how LINE, KakaoTalk, OneDrive and Flickr are being disrupted in China. We find that Flickr and OneDrive remain consistently blocked, but LINE and KakaoTalk show inconsistent fluctuation between accessibility and inaccessibility. We also analyze security and privacy of FireChat and test accessibility of the service in China.
Citizen Lab has selected Philipp Winter as its 2014 Google Policy Fellow. Philipp is a PhD Student at Karlstad University conducting research about censorship-resistant communication. This is the sixth year Citizen Lab has participated in the program.
In this post we examine how the Great Firewall of China is implementing DNS tampering and HTTP request filtering on KakaoTalk and LINE domains, which is disrupting service of the applications as a result. We find that Flickr and OneDrive are also blocked through DNS tampering. We also analyze recent changes to the LINE keyword filtering list.
The May 2014 coup d’etat in Thailand was the 19th coup attempt in the country’s history. It stands out from previous coups due to the military junta’s focus on information controls. In this report we document the results of network measurements to determine how the Internet is currently being filtered in Thailand and discuss other forms of information control implemented in the coup’s aftermath.
The Jordanian Media Commission has blocked access to 7iber.org from within the country. It was removed via the Press and Publication Law, which requires all media commentary on the “Kingdom’s internal or external affairs” to be approved by licensing from the Jordanian Media Commission.
This edition of Social Media Watch deals with top court rulings on digital privacy, social media monitoring, and mobile security news.
We analyze a newly discovered Android implant that we attribute to Hacking Team and highlight the political subtext of the bait content and attack context. In addition, we expose the functionality and architecture of Hacking Team’s Remote Control system and operator tradecraft in never-before published detail.
