UPDATE: The 2019 Citizen Lab Summer Institute will take place on July 31-August 2 at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Canada. The Citizen Lab Summer Institute (CLSI) provides a unique opportunity to meet a diverse group of researchers, practitioners, and advocates and develop new and exciting research that addresses pressing questions for the Internet…. Read more »
In this work, we study how Tencent implements image filtering on WeChat. We found that Tencent implements realtime, automatic censorship of chat images on WeChat based on what text is in an image and based on an image’s visual similarity to those on a blacklist. Tencent facilitates this realtime filtering by maintaining a hash index of MD5 hashes of sensitive image files.
Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic websites and online personas used to spread false and divisive information primarily targeting Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel. Using this network as an illustration, this report highlights the challenges of investigating and addressing disinformation from research and policy perspectives.
He provided oral comments to the committee which were, substantially, a truncated version of the brief he submitted. His oral comments are available to download, and what follows in this post is the actual brief which was submitted.
The Information Controls Fellowship Program (ICFP) from the Open Technology Fund (OTF) supports research into how governments in countries, regions, or areas of OTF’s core focus are restricting the free flow of information, cutting access to the open Internet, and implementing censorship mechanisms, thereby threatening the ability of global citizens to exercise basic human rights and democracy; work focused on mitigation of such threats is also supported.
We are writing to ask you to ensure that Google drops Project Dragonfly and any plans to launch a censored search app in China, and to re-affirm the company’s 2010 commitment that it won’t provide censored search services in the country.
The Citizen Lab Summer Institute (CLSI) brings together technologists, political scientists, academics, researchers, activists, artists, and members of civil society to address some the most pressing issues at the centre of technology and human rights.
في هذا التقرير ، نَصِف كيف تم استهداف المقيم الدائم في كندا، والمنشق السعودي؛ “عمر عبد العزيز”، عبر إشعار مزيف عن “تتبع شحنة بريد”. نحن وجدنا -وبثقة عالية- أن هاتف عبد العزيز قد تم استهدافه ببرنامج التجسس “بيغاسوس” من شركة NSO. نعزو هذه الإصابة إلى مشغل “بيغاسوس” مرتبط بالمملكة العربية السعودية.
This report demonstrates the technical underpinnings of how WeChat image censorship operates and suggests possible evasion strategies.
Critical analysis and insight that navigates the complex implications of ongoing encryption debates.
