This report demonstrates the technical underpinnings of how WeChat image censorship operates and suggests possible evasion strategies.

Critical analysis and insight that navigates the complex implications of ongoing encryption debates.

If you’re attending RightsCon, you’ll be in good company. Held this year in Toronto from May 16-18, the conference brings together an international audience to discuss all topics related to human rights in the digital age. Citizen Lab researchers, fellows, and associates will be participating in panels and events throughout the week. Here’s a run-down… Read more »

In light of Citizen Lab’s recent report which showed that Canadian technology is being used to block LGBTQ2 content in several countries around the world, Citizen Lab director Ron Deibert has penned a letter to MP Randy Boissonnault, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on LGBTQ2 Issues. Planet Netsweeper revealed that Netsweeper– a company based in Waterloo,… Read more »

This report describes our investigation into the global proliferation of Internet filtering systems manufactured by the Canadian company, Netsweeper Inc.

This section details the research questions that informed our study. We also outline in detail the methods that we adopted to identify Netsweeper installations worldwide, and those that we employed to reduce the findings to countries of interest. We also present high-level technical findings and observations.

In this section, we spotlight several countries where we have evidence of public ISPs blocking websites using Netsweeper’s products. Each country has significant human rights, public policy, insecurity, or corruption challenges, and/or a history of using Internet censorship to prevent access to content that is protected under international human rights frameworks.

This section examines the legal, regulatory, corporate social responsibility, and other public policy issues raised by our report’s findings. We focus on the responsibilities of Netsweeper, Inc. and the obligations of the Canadian government under international human rights law.

يشرح هذا التقرير تحقيقنا عن استخدام واضح لأجهزة فحص عميق للحزم (DPI) من شركة ساندفين\بروكيرا لنشر البرامج الضارة في تركيا وبشكل غير مباشر إلى سوريا، وجمع الأموال سرا من خلال الإعلانات التابعة لتعدين العملات الرقمية في مصر.

In this post, we evaluate the Government’s explanation of some of the more problematic elements of Bill C-59 in its briefing notes. We ultimately conclude that while the government’s briefing material provides insight into some of the ways that the CSE might act following the passage of the CSE Act, the material itself does not resolve our concerns with the CSE Act.