New York Times journalist Ben Hubbard was targeted with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware via a June 2018 SMS message promising details about “Ben Hubbard and the story of the Saudi Royal Family.” The SMS contained a hyperlink to a website used by a Pegasus operator that we call KINGDOM. We have linked KINGDOM to Saudi Arabia. In 2018, KINGDOM also targeted Saudi dissidents including Omar Abdulaziz, Ghanem al-Masarir, and Yahya Assiri, as well as a staff member at Amnesty International.

The Citizen Lab has sent an open letter to Francisco Partners in light of the apparent misuse of NSO Group’s technology– a company in which we believe Francisco Partners has a majority stake– and to request timely action in regards to issues raised in previous correspondence.

In this post, we develop new Internet scanning techniques to identify 45 countries in which operators of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware may be conducting operations.

This profile is part of the Citizen Lab’s research on digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and silence exiled dissidents and diaspora communities. It is part of the broader practice of transnational repression, which refers to states using methods such as harassment, coercion-by-proxy, kidnapping, and assassination… Read more »

This country spotlight is part of the Citizen Lab’s research on digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and silence exiled dissidents and diaspora communities. It is part of the broader practice of transnational repression, which refers to states using methods such as harassment, coercion-by-proxy, kidnapping, and… Read more »

This country spotlight is part of the Citizen Lab’s research on digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression arises when governments use digital technologies to surveil, intimidate and silence exiled dissidents and diaspora communities. It is part of the broader practice of transnational repression, which refers to states using methods such as harassment, coercion-by-proxy, kidnapping, and… Read more »

本研究基於來自 24 個國家、居住在 23 個庇護國的 85 位女性人權捍衛者的真實經歷，探討性別與性取向如何在數碼跨境鎮壓中作為關鍵因素。我們將跨境鎮壓中此一特定向度稱為「基於性別的數碼跨境鎮壓」。

我们通过来自24个国家、居住在23个庇护国的85名女性人权捍卫者的亲身经历，对性别和性取向如何在数码跨国镇压中作为关键因素而进行研究。

Ce document est une traduction informelle de certaines sections du rapport, en particulier l’introduction, un résumé de haut niveau de nos conclusions et des recommandations politiques. Ce n’est pas une traduction complète du rapport et, en tant que traduction informelle, elle peut contenir des inexactitudes. Cette traduction n’a pour but que de fournir une compréhension… Read more »

Данный документ представляет собой неофициальный перевод отдельных разделов отчета, в частности, введения, общих итогов и рекомендаций касательно комплекса мер. Это не полный перевод отчета и, поскольку это неофициальный перевод, в нем могут быть неточности. Данный перевод предназначен только для того, чтобы читатель составил общее представление о нашем исследовании. В случае каких-либо расхождений или двусмысленностей преимущественную… Read more »