Posts tagged “China”
A new report from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab identifies security and privacy issues in QQ Browser, a mobile browser produced by China-based Internet giant Tencent, which may put many millions of users of the application at risk of serious compromise.
多伦多大学公民实验室的最新报告揭露了QQ浏览器存在的多处隐私与安全问题。QQ浏览器是一款由中国网络巨头腾讯开发的移动浏览器，而这些问题很可能会将数以百万的用户至于严峻的风险中。
A new report from the Citizen Lab reveals that Baidu Browser, a popular mobile browser based in China and used by millions of people, has numerous privacy and security issues that could put users’ communications at risk.
多伦多大学公民实验室的最新报告揭露了百度浏览器存在的多处隐私与安全问题。百度浏览器是基于中国的一款移动浏览器，拥有数百万的用户，而报告反映的隐私与安全问题很可能会至用户的沟通于风险中。
This report describes privacy and security issues with Baidu Browser, a web browser for the Windows and Android platforms. Our research shows that the application transmits personal user data to Baidu servers without encryption and with easily decryptable encryption, and is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution during software updates via man-in-the-middle attacks. Much of the data leakage is the result of a shared Baidu software development kit, which affects hundreds of additional applications.
Freedom House has released their “Freedom on the Net 2015” report, placing China at the bottom of a ranking comprising 65 countries. The report cites the Citizen Lab’s research on China, specifically on chat application censorship and targeted threats.
In an article written for Foreign Affairs, Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Jason Q. Ng discusses the crackdown of “rumours” on the popular Chinese WeChat mobile application, and its broader implications for censorship in the country.
Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Jason Q. Ng spoke to the China Economic Review on the findings of the UC Browser report, and the impact of security vulnerabilities on users.
In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.
