Access My Info (AMI), a web tool used to submit disclosure requests to companies on the data they collect and share with third parties about their customers, has now been expanded to submit disclosure requests to fitness tracker companies and dating applications.
Posts tagged “Canada”
Citizen Lab Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons reviewed documents on BlackBerry for the CBC, and was interviewed by VICE on Canada’s RCMP’s use of IMSI catchers.
Recent reports have indicated that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has had a key to unlock encrypted messages sent between BlackBerry users since 2010. Citizen Lab Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons commented on the significance of the revelations in an interview with VICE Motherboard.
Court documents provided in a case before the Quebec Court of Appeal indicate that the RCMP used advanced technology to spy on mobile phones in a criminal investigation on organized crime. Citizen Lab Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons spoke to the Globe and Mail about the case.
In a guest post on JustSecurity co-authored with Tamir Israel of the Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC), Citizen Lab Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons urged a revaluation of Canada’s intelligence sharing with its Five Eyes allies.
Canada’s Department of National Defence, and its associated research wing, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), are looking to purchase software to analyze social media streams in real-time. Christopher Parsons weighs in on concerns of the possibility of accidentally collecting Canadians’ personal information.
A “secret network” launched by the Canadian federal government last year, costing millions of dollars to taxpayers, came under close scrutiny following a suspected hack. Citizen Lab Postdoctoral Fellow Christoper Parsons explains the possibilities behind the leaking of the document.
This article, written by Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons and CIPPIC Staff lawyer Tamir Israel, analyzes how successive federal governments of Canada have actively sought to weaken the communications encryption available to Canadians. The article covers regulations imposed on mobile telecommunications providers, state authorities’ abilities to compel decryption keys from telecommunications providers writ large, and Canada’s signals intelligence agency’s deliberate propagation of flawed encryption protocols.
The report, authored by Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons, examines how contemporary telecommunications surveillance is governed in Canada. He concludes that serious failures in transparency and accountability indicate that corporations are failing to manage Canadians’ personal information responsibly and that government irresponsibility surrounding accountability strains its credibility and aggravates citizens’ cynicism about the political process.
Our report reveals that UC Browser poorly secures data in its English and Chinese language versions for Android.