Emile Dirks, Research Associate at the Citizen Lab, prepared a written submission for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) about the state of human rights in the country. The CECC was established by Congress in October 2000, with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China,… Read more »

As part of our ongoing project monitoring changes to Chinese search censorship, we tracked changes to censorship following Li Keqiang’s death across seven Internet platforms: Baidu, Baidu Zhidao, Bilibili, Microsoft Bing, Jingdong, Sogou, and Weibo. We found that some keyword combinations in search queries triggers hard censorship whereas others trigger soft censorship. Our results demonstrate China’s ongoing efforts to push state-sanctioned narratives concerning politically sensitive topics, impacting the integrity of the online information environment.

我們分析了騰訊的搜狗拼音輸入法，該輸入法每月活躍使用者超過 4.5 億，是中國最受歡迎的中文輸入法。

We conducted the first analysis of WeChat’s tracking ecosystem. Using reverse engineering methods to intercept WeChat’s network requests, we identified exactly what types of data the WeChat app is sending to its servers, and when. This report is part one of a two-part series on a privacy and security analysis of the WeChat ecosystem.

This FAQ accompanies the full report on privacy in the WeChat ecosystem. We analyzes privacy issues with popular app WeChat by reviewing the data collected by the app and sent to WeChat servers during the regular operation of its various features. We find that they collect more usage data than is disclosed in the WeChat privacy policy.

We discovered over 60,000 unique censorship rules used to partially or totally censor search results across eight China-accessible search platforms analyzed. These findings call into question the ability of non-Chinese technology companies to better resist censorship demands than their Chinese counterparts.

We discovered over 60,000 unique censorship rules used to partially or totally censor search results across eight China-accessible search platforms analyzed. These findings call into question the ability of non-Chinese technology companies to better resist censorship demands than their Chinese counterparts.

We consistently found that Bing censors politically sensitive Chinese names over time, that their censorship spans multiple Chinese political topics, consists of at least two languages—English and Chinese—and applies to different world regions, including China, the United States, and Canada.

本報告研究微軟必應自動建議功能（autosuggestion）針對人名的審查。我們發現，除了審查與色情相關的人名，第二大被微軟必應審查的人名類別是與中國領導人，異議人士相關以及其他在中國被認為是政治敏感的人名。