自我們的初次報告以來，我們發現蘋果公司已經停止了在台灣進行針對中國政治敏感內容的審查。然而，盡管人權組織建議美國公司抵制內容審查，蘋果公司仍然繼續在中國大陸以外的香港地區進行廣泛的、基于關鍵詞的政治審查。

自我们的初次报告以来，我们发现苹果公司已经停止了在台湾进行针对中国政治敏感内容的审查。然而，尽管人权组织建议美国公司抵制内容审查，苹果公司仍然继续在中国大陆以外的香港地区进行广泛的、基于关键词的政治审查。

Using the AMI approach, partners have launched projects around the world, including in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea. These projects focused on making data access requests to telecommunications companies in each country, led by a local researcher and a team of volunteers. Every country has specific laws, regulations, and corporate mechanisms that present unique challenges and opportunities in accessing data, but the results of each provide insights into the larger ecosystem of data access. 

This report presents results from a series of research projects that measured responses to personal data requests from telecommunication companies and Internet Service Providers across jurisdictions in Asia including Australia, Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Overall, the projects found responses from telecoms were incomplete and in some cases did not follow what is required by law.

Access My Info (AMI), a web tool used to submit disclosure requests to telecommunications providers on the data they collect and share with third parties about their customers, launched in Hong Kong.

In this research note, we analyze a malware campaign targeting Hong Kong democracy activists. Two new malware families are used in the campaign that we name UP007 and SLServer. Previous reports have shown overlap in the tactics, tools, and procedures used in this campaign in other operations targeting groups in Burma, Hong Kong, and the Tibetan community.

This post analyzes targeted malware attacks against groups in the Tibetan diaspora and Hong Kong that leverage the CVE-2014-4114 vulnerability