This post describes our analysis of China’s “Great Cannon,” our term for an attack tool that we identify as separate from, but co-located with, the Great Firewall of China. The first known usage of the Great Cannon is in the recent large-scale novel DDoS attack on both GitHub and servers used by GreatFire.org.

Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert authored an article entitled “Who Knows What Evils Lurk in the Shadows?” published on OpenCanada.org.

Citizen Lab is sending an open letter to Hacking Team, providing a copy of our latest report on the company and highlighting our reasons for concern from these latest findings.

A new report, entitled “Communities @ Risk: Targeted Digital Threats Against Civil Society,” involved 10 civil society groups that enrolled as study subjects over a period of four years. The study sought to obtain greater visibility into an often overlooked digital risk environment affecting–whether they know it or not–many of society’s most essential institutions.

A new Citizen Lab report has found that Canada-based Netsweeper filtering products have been identified on three ISPs in Somalia.

This report, Islands of Control, Islands of Resistance: Monitoring the 2013 Indonesian IGF, is the first in a series of Citizen Lab reports that apply a mixture of methods, from technical interrogation to field research and social and legal analyses, to study information controls in and around particular events. This report focuses on information controls in and around Indonesia’s hosting of the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF).

This post analyzes the multistakeholder participation in the 2013 IGF in Indonesia, which has been lauded as a model for how different stakeholdergroups can operate at these events, and discusses developments in the country’s Internet governance agenda.

This blog post seeks to map out the infrastructure and governance of ICTs in the country, and explores the trends and challenges regarding the right to freedom of expression and access to information, that is grounded in the universal human rights framework.

An Indonesian translation of this post is available here.

Terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia dari halaman ini tersedia disini.

Building on past network measurements, legal, and policy analyses undertaken by the OpenNet Initiative, we set out to apply a mixed-methods approach to better understand the current situation. Our analysis is set in the context not only of the 2013 IGF, but amidst increasingly intense debates about free expression and access to information, and rapid technological change and development.

This post will summarize Citizen Lab’s prior research on surveillance in Indonesia, including documented evidence of FinFisher command and control servers and Blue Coat Systems devices on IPs owned by Indonesian ISPs. It will then identify recent trends in Indonesian surveillance practices, laws, and regulations that provide potential avenues for further research.