Citizen Lab’s Irene Poetranto authored an op-ed on the blocking of Vimeo, a video-sharing site, in Indonesia.

The trajectories of the U.S. and Chinese governments on cyber security have officially diverged with the May 19 unsealing of an indictment against five Chinese nationals accused of cyber espionage against U.S. companies.

In this post we explain how Canadians can issue requests to their telecommunications companies to learn what personal information those companies collect, retain, and disclose about them. We argue that Canadians should do this both to empower themselves and to enable Canadian policy experts and government officials to better hold the companies to account.

Ron Deibert was interviewed by Amanda Lang on CBC’s Lang & O’Leary Exchange about what’s changed with regard to online privacy since Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA.

Christopher Parsons was interviewed by a number of media outlets throughout March, focusing on government access to telecommunications data held by private companies, and on companies’ internal data handling practices.

Deibert was joined by Omar El Akkad, Technology reporter at the Globe and Mail and Mornay Walters, Chief Executive Officer of Seecrypt Group, a maker of secure communications software for mobile devices.

Penney writes about how the Fair Elections Act will make it even easier for Canadian political parties to access our personal information and undermine democracy.

In this post we analyze the partial disclosures concerning Canada’s federal agencies’ domestic telecommunications surveillance practices. We argue that key federal agencies remain unaccountable to Parliamentarians and the Canadian public alike, and that accountability measures are urgently needed for Canadians to understand the extent of their federal government’s surveillance activities.

On January 20, 2014 the Citizen Lab along with leading Canadian academics and civil liberties groups asked Canadian telecommunications companies to reveal the extent to which they disclose information to state authorities. This post summarizes and analyzes the responses from the companies, and argues that the companies have done little to ultimately clarify their disclosure policies. We conclude by indicating the subsequent steps in this research project.

Our analysis traces Hacking Team’s Remote Control System’s (RCS) proxy chains, and finds that dedicated US-based servers are part of the RCS infrastructure implemented by the governments of Azerbaijan, Colombia, Ethiopia, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Poland, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates in their espionage and/or law enforcement operations.