App Privacy and Controls
Research into privacy, security, and information controls of popular applications.
Featured in App Privacy and Controls
يفحص هذا التقرير التشفير الذي يحمي الاجتماعات في تطبيق Zoom الرائج. وجدنا أن Zoom لديه نظام تشفير “خاص به” ، ويحتوي على نقاط ضعف كبيرة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك حددنا نقاط تثير القلق في البنية التحتية لـ Zoom ، بما في ذلك نقل مفاتيح التشفير للاجتماعات عبر الصين.
In this note, we describe a security issue where users in the “Waiting Room” of a Zoom meeting could have spied on the meeting, even if they were not approved to join. Zoom fixed the issue after we reported it to them.
This report provides an in-depth legal and policy analysis of technology-facilitated intimate partner surveillance (IPS) under Canadian law. Stalkerware apps are designed to facilitate remote surveillance of an individual’s mobile device use with the surveillance often being covert or advertised as such. Despite increasing recognition of the prevalence of technology-enabled intimate partner abuse and harassment, the legality of the creation, sale, and use of consumer-level spyware apps has not yet been closely considered by Canadian courts, legislators, or regulators.
This report was collaboratively written by researchers from computer science, political science, criminology, law, and journalism studies. As befits their expertise, the report is divided into several parts, with each focusing on specific aspects of the consumer spyware ecosystem, which includes: technical elements associated stalkerware applications, stalkerware companies’ marketing activities and public policies, and these companies’ compliance with Canadian federal commercial privacy legislation.
The post covers several categories of information that can be gleaned from examining Strava’s fitness tracker data, ranging from enabling the identification of secret military facilities in “dark areas” to specific identifiable behaviour patterns of at-risk individuals.