في شهري يوليو وأغسطس 2020 استخدم عملاءٌ حكوميون برنامج التجسس بيغاسوس “Pegasus” من مجموعة “NSO” لاختراق 36 هاتفاً شخصياً لصحفيين ومنتجين ومراسلين و مدراء تنفيذيين في قناة الجزيرة. كما تم اختراق هاتف صحفية في قناة العربي، التي مقرها لندن.
On December 7, 2020, the Citizen Lab published a report that investigates Huawei, 5G technologies, and Canadian telecommunications issues. Drawing exclusively on open-source reporting, it finds that Canada does not have a Huawei problem, per se; it has a 5G strategy problem that is linked to the Government of Canada lacking a principle-driven set of integrated industrial, cyber security, and foreign policy strategies. This document provides a summary of the research findings and questions and answers from the research team.
Circles is a surveillance firm that reportedly exploits weaknesses in the global mobile phone system to snoop on calls, texts, and the location of phones around the globe, and is affiliated with NSO Group, which develops the oft-abused Pegasus spyware. Using Internet scanning, we found a unique signature associated with the hostnames of Check Point firewalls used in Circles deployments, enabling us to identify Circles deployments in at least 25 countries.
This annotated bibliography compiles and summarizes relevant literature on “digital transnational repression” (i.e., where states seek to exert pressure—using digital tools—on citizens living abroad in order to constrain, limit, or eliminate political or social action that threatens regime stability or social and cultural norms within the country). While transnational repression itself is not a new phenomenon, there has been limited research on how such repression is enabled and expanded by digital tools.
It is encouraging to see the provincial government undertake efforts to improve the state of privacy law in Ontario, given the increasingly ubiquitous data commodification and surveillance of our behaviours, bodies, online and offline activities, and lives. To that end, the Citizen Lab submitted a brief which included 21 recommendations for legal and policy reform in Ontario, with a view to strengthening the privacy and data protection rights of individuals in the province.
This submission outlines Canadian technology companies and the threat they pose to human rights abroad, as well as suggests mechanisms the Government of Canada’s RBC strategy can adopt to address the harmful impacts of Canadian-made technology.
This document provides an explainer to a new report from Citizen Lab and the International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law on the use and human rights implications of algorithmic policing practices in Canada.
How do information controls impact different communities? Debates on Internet-enabled mass surveillance practices have increasingly dominated mainstream conversations, especially after the Snowden revelations. However, what is not as well documented is targeted surveillance operations against civil society that threaten their ability to hold governments accountable.
How do events on the ground impact information control online? The Internet has amplified citizens’ communication, allowing them to organize and mobilize for political or social causes. Major sporting events have been used to introduce security measures and justify surveillance capabilities that often have a lasting legacy in the countries or regions where this happens.
The encroachments to OTF highlight why independent and transparent funding sources for research and development on Internet freedom are so important. Providing this type of support within a large government organisation can be difficult. OTF was an example of how to do that right. Losing that example will be a loss not only to the practitioners and researchers that have grown through the support of OTF but the wider community of marginalized people they support.
