This report, Islands of Control, Islands of Resistance: Monitoring the 2013 Indonesian IGF, is the first in a series of Citizen Lab reports that apply a mixture of methods, from technical interrogation to field research and social and legal analyses, to study information controls in and around particular events. This report focuses on information controls in and around Indonesia’s hosting of the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF).

This post is an introduction to Asia Chats a research project analyzing
information controls and privacy in mobile messaging applications used
in Asia. The project will produce a series of reports that will begin
with a focus on WeChat, LINE, and KakaoTalk. Reports will include
analysis based on our technical investigation of censorship or
surveillance functionality, assessment of privacy issues surrounding
these applications’ use and storage of user data, and comparison of the
terms of service and privacy policies of the applications.

This post analyzes the multistakeholder participation in the 2013 IGF in Indonesia, which has been lauded as a model for how different stakeholdergroups can operate at these events, and discusses developments in the country’s Internet governance agenda.

While the Mexican government has long been suspected of purchasing surveillance equipment, the frequency of these purchases and the level of public funds allocated to them are rapidly increasing. Last February,  New York Times published an investigative report on a USD 355 million outlay by the Mexican Ministry of Defense for sophisticated surveillance equipment. Six months earlier, Carmen Artistegui, a renowned investigative journalist in Mexico, published a report documenting five contracts from the Secretariat of National Defense for the purchase of surveillance technologies. All five contracts were confidential and granted to a single company headquartered in the state of Jalisco called Security Tracking Devices, Inc.

Cyber Steward Network partner Renata Avila details her efforts to bring legal action against FinFisher in Mexico.

Building on past network measurements, legal, and policy analyses undertaken by the OpenNet Initiative, we set out to apply a mixed-methods approach to better understand the current situation. Our analysis is set in the context not only of the 2013 IGF, but amidst increasingly intense debates about free expression and access to information, and rapid technological change and development.

This post will summarize Citizen Lab’s prior research on surveillance in Indonesia, including documented evidence of FinFisher command and control servers and Blue Coat Systems devices on IPs owned by Indonesian ISPs. It will then identify recent trends in Indonesian surveillance practices, laws, and regulations that provide potential avenues for further research.

This is the Indonesian translation of “Monitoring Information Controls During the Bali IGF,” the first post of a Citizen Lab series that will explore online freedom of expression and the state of information controls in Indonesia in the context of their role as host of the 2013 IGF.

On October 22-25, 2013, Indonesia will host the eighth annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the issues and policies of Internet governance. The main theme of this year’s IGF is “Building Bridges: Enhancing Multi-stakeholder Cooperation for Growth and Sustainable Development.”

This post is the first in a series that will explore online freedom of expression and the state of information controls in Indonesia in the context of their role as host of the IGF.

An Indonesian translation of this post is available here.

Terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia dari halaman ini tersedia disini.