Citizen Lab Post-doctoral Fellow Chris Parsons on surveillance and privacy
Citizen Lab Post-doctoral Fellow Chris Parsons was interviewed by a number of media outlets with regard to surveillance and privacy.
Citizen Lab Post-doctoral Fellow Chris Parsons was interviewed by a number of media outlets with regard to surveillance and privacy.
Our analysis traces Hacking Team’s Remote Control System’s (RCS) proxy chains, and finds that dedicated US-based servers are part of the RCS infrastructure implemented by the governments of Azerbaijan, Colombia, Ethiopia, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Poland, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates in their espionage and/or law enforcement operations.
This report maps out covert surveillance networks of “proxy servers” used to launder data that RCS exfiltrates from infected computers, through third countries, to an “endpoint,” which we believe represents the spyware’s government operator.
Canadians should demand more from government in reigning in electronic spying and cyber-policing. But we should also, as citizens, subscribers, and users, demand more from our internet and telecommunication service providers.
Th upcoming Sochi Olympics are drawing media attention to the well-documented cyber surveillance system in Russia.
Investigative Journalist Andrei Soldatov was invited to make a contribution to an inquiry on the Russian electronic mass surveillance system.
In this report, Citizen Lab researchers Morgan Marquis-Boire and John Scott-Railton and EFF Global Policy Analyst Eva Galperin outline how pro-government attackers have targeted the Syrian opposition, as well as NGO workers and journalists, with social engineering and “Remote Access Tools” (RAT)
What to do about the growing “Digital Arms” market? The spread of technologies like mobile phones and social networks have enabled corporations and governments to eavesdrop on a mass scale. Fulfilling the demand for surveillance tools, a range of companies now sell surveillance backdoors and vulnerabilities, described as “lawful intercept” software.
In January 2013, Cyber Steward partner Bytes for All (B4A) submitted a petition to the Lahore High Court to challenge Internet censorship in the country. This case, in collaboration with the Media Legal Defense Initiative, a non-governmental organisation which helps journalists and independent media outlets around the world defend their rights, highlighted the ongoing censorship of YouTube in Pakistan. The popular video-sharing site has been blocked since 2012 since YouTube refused to remove the controversial anti-Islamic “Innocence of Muslims” video.
While the Mexican government has long been suspected of purchasing surveillance equipment, the frequency of these purchases and the level of public funds allocated to them are rapidly increasing. Last February, New York Times published an investigative report on a USD 355 million outlay by the Mexican Ministry of Defense for sophisticated surveillance equipment. Six months earlier, Carmen Artistegui, a renowned investigative journalist in Mexico, published a report documenting five contracts from the Secretariat of National Defense for the purchase of surveillance technologies. All five contracts were confidential and granted to a single company headquartered in the state of Jalisco called Security Tracking Devices, Inc.