Search Results for: surveillance

IGF 2013: Exploring Communications Surveillance in Indonesia (Part 3 of 4)

This post will summarize Citizen Lab’s prior research on surveillance in Indonesia, including documented evidence of FinFisher command and control servers and Blue Coat Systems devices on IPs owned by Indonesian ISPs. It will then identify recent trends in Indonesian surveillance practices, laws, and regulations that provide potential avenues for further research.

Shutting the Backdoor: The Perils of National Security and Digital Surveillance Programs

The Citizen Lab is pleased to announce the release of a new report by Director Ron Deibert, “Shutting the Backdoor: The Perils of National Security and Digital Surveillance Programs,” written for the Strategic Studies Working Group (SSWG), a partnership between the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) and the Canadian International Council (CIC).

Paradigm Initiative Nigeria Seeks Information on Surveillance Systems in Nigeria

Recent research from The Citizen Lab has detected the presence of devices capable of surveillance on networks operated by Nigerian Internet service providers. In January 2013, Citizen Lab researchers found installations of Blue Coat Systems’ PacketShaper device on netblocks associated with IPNX ISP and Cobranet. In April 2013, Citizen Lab released “For Their Eyes Only: The Commercialization of Digital Spying,” in which researchers identified FinFisher servers on a network operated by Suburban Telecom.

Using the China Chats surveillance/censorship keyword list: analyzing blocked terms, search result numbers, and overlaps of censored terms between services

Working with the just-released China Chats keyword list, Jason Q. Ng extended The Citizen Lab/UNM’s analysis by checking whether each of the 4,256 keywords was blocked from searching on Sina Weibo. This report includes further analysis and examination of other potential censorship tactics by Weibo revealed in the data.

China Chats: Tracking surveillance and censorship in TOM-Skype and Sina UC

In this collaborative study between the Citizen Lab and Department of Computer Science at the University of New Mexico we examine the implementation of censorship and surveillance in two IM clients maintained by two different Chinese companies. For a period of more than a year and a half, we downloaded and decrypted the censorship and surveillance keyword lists used by the client software of two IM programs used in China: TOM-Skype and Sina UC.

Bytes for All Petitions Pakistani Court on Presence of Surveillance Software

On May 13, 2013, Bytes for All (B4A), a Pakistani civil society group and partner in the Cyber Stewards Network, filed a petition with the Lahore High Court on the possible use of the FinFisher product suite in Pakistan. B4A has advocated for the rights of Pakistani netizens to browse the Internet free of censorship and surveillance through numerous court and government actions, including a recent petition submitted in January 2013 in protest of the ongoing censorship of YouTube.