Tibet Action Institute publishes report on Youku video platform censorship
Tibet Action Institute has released a report documenting censorship on Youku, an online video platform.
Tibet Action Institute has released a report documenting censorship on Youku, an online video platform.
Citizen Lab Researcher Lotus Ruan was interviewed by VOA Mandarin on the recent release of the report entitled “One App Two Systems, How WeChat uses one censorship policy in China and another internationally.”
In this report we provide the first systematic study of keyword and website censorship on WeChat, the most popular chat app in China
In this report, we reverse engineer three popular live streaming platforms (YY, Sina Show, and 9158) and find keyword lists used to censor chat messages. Tracking changes to the keyword lists over the past year gives an inside look into how these applications implement censorship
In an interview with the Daily Dot, Citizen Lab Research Manager Masashi Crete-Nishihata commented on the challenges Tibetans face in using social media and other online tools to spread content considered politically sensitive by the Chinese government.
This report describes how a government targeted an internationally recognized human rights defender, Ahmed Mansoor, with the Trident, a chain of zero-day exploits designed to infect his iPhone with sophisticated commercial spyware.
Citizen Lab Research Manager Masashi Crete-Nishihata was interviewed by Al Jazeera regarding censorship practices in popular Asian instant messaging applications.
A Canadian Internet filtering company, Netsweeper, is blocking Internet content during armed conflict in Yemen following the dictates of the rebel group, the Houthis, according to a new report from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab.
In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.
This report is an analysis of the types of content removed by WeChat on its public accounts (also known as “official accounts”) blogging platform.