Search Results for: nso group

The not-so-silent type: Vulnerabilities across keyboard apps reveal keystrokes to network eavesdroppers

In this report, we examine cloud-based pinyin keyboard apps from nine vendors (Baidu, Honor, Huawei, iFlyTek, OPPO, Samsung, Tencent, Vivo, and Xiaomi) for vulnerabilities in how the apps transmit user keystrokes. Our analysis found that eight of the nine apps identified contained vulnerabilities that could be exploited to completely reveal the contents of users’ keystrokes in transit. We estimate that up to one billion users could be vulnerable to having all of their keystrokes intercepted, constituting a tremendous risk to user security.

Call for applications: Information Controls Fellowship Program 2024

The Citizen Lab co-founded the program with OTF and has been a host organization since its inception. We welcome proposals from fellowship candidates for research projects related to our current thematic areas and applications are open to people from a variety of backgrounds and disciplines and can include students and junior to mid-career practitioners.

Submission to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security: Charter analysis concerning cybersecurity and telecommunications reform in Bill C-26

On June 14, 2022, Bill C-26, an Act respecting cybersecurity, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts, was introduced into Parliament for the first reading by Canada’s Minister of Public Safety, Marco Mendicino. Hearings on Bill C-26 are scheduled to begin in SECU (the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Safety and… Read more »

Finding You: The Network Effect of Telecommunications Vulnerabilities for Location Disclosure

This report provides a comprehensive guide to geolocation-related threats sourced from 3G, 4G, and 5G network operators. Case studies, references, examples, and evidence are provided to give a complete and contextual understanding of mobile network-based location tracking in order to formulate policies and actions that protect civil society from current and future geolocation surveillance.

PREDATOR في الاتصالات: أحمد الطنطاوي مستهدف ببرنامج التجسس Predator بعد الإعلان عن نيته للترشح للرئاسة

بين شهري مايو وسبتمبر 2023، استُهدِف عضو البرلمان المصري السابق أحمد الطنطاوي ببرنامج التجسس Predator من Cytrox عبر روابط أُرسلت إليه عبر رسائل قصيرة و رسائل WhatsApp. وقع الاستهداف بعد أن صرح الطنطاوي علنًا بخطته للترشح لمنصب الرئاسة في الانتخابات المصرية لعام 2024.

PREDATOR IN THE WIRES: Ahmed Eltantawy Targeted with Predator Spyware After Announcing Presidential Ambitions

Between May and September 2023, former Egyptian MP Ahmed Eltantawy was targeted with Cytrox’s Predator spyware via links sent on SMS and WhatsApp after Eltantawy publicly stated his plans to run for President in the 2024 Egyptian elections. As Egypt is a known customer of Cytrox’s Predator spyware, and the spyware was delivered via network injection from a device located physically inside Egypt, we attribute the attack to the Egyptian government with high confidence.

Beautiful Bauhinia: “HKLeaks” – The Use of Covert and Overt Online Harassment Tactics to Repress 2019 Hong Kong Protests

In August 2019 a wave of websites and social media channels, called “HKLEAKS,” began “doxxing” the identities and personal information of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. While the creators of these sites and channels claimed that HKLEAKS was the product of local volunteer communities, several indicators suggest a coordinated information operation conducted by professional actors in alignment with Chinese state interests.

Should We Chat? Privacy in the WeChat Ecosystem

We conducted the first analysis of WeChat’s tracking ecosystem. Using reverse engineering methods to intercept WeChat’s network requests, we identified exactly what types of data the WeChat app is sending to its servers, and when. This report is part one of a two-part series on a privacy and security analysis of the WeChat ecosystem.

Information Controls Fellowship Program 2023 [CLOSED]

The Information Controls Fellowship Program (ICFP) from the Open Technology Fund (OTF) fosters research, outputs, and creative collaboration on repressive Internet censorship and surveillance issues. The program supports examination into how governments in countries, regions, or areas of OTF’s core focus are restricting the free flow of information, cutting access to the open Internet, and… Read more »