Citizen Lab examined a set of documents leaked to news outlet The Intercept that describe plans to develop and launch an Iranian mobile network, including subscriber management operations and services, and integration with a legal intercept solution. If implemented fully as envisioned, it would enable state authorities to directly monitor, intercept, redirect, degrade or deny all Iranians’ mobile communications, including those who are presently challenging the regime.

Senior researcher, Irene Poetranto, discusses a joint report written by the Citizen Lab, OutRight Action International, and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), focused on LGBTIQ website censorship and its impact on LGBTIQ communities.

The Citizen Lab, OutRight Action International, and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) collaborated to conduct research on LGBTIQ website censorship and its impact on LGBTIQ communities. The results indicate the technical and legal obstacles many users have in accessing LGBTIQ news, health, and human rights websites.

Tujuan dari penelitian kami adalah sebagai berikut. Mendokumentasikan situs web LGBTIQ mana yang diblokir di enam negara; Menyelidiki bagaimana penyensoran situs LGBTIQ berdampak pada komunitas LGBTIQ lokal dan gerakan mereka untuk mengamankan keadilan dan kesetaraan; dan
Menentukan bagaimana Penyedia Jasa Internet (ISP) lokal menerapkan pemblokiran situs web.

Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic websites and online personas used to spread false and divisive information primarily targeting Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel. Using this network as an illustration, this report highlights the challenges of investigating and addressing disinformation from research and policy perspectives.

This report describes a malware operation against the Syrian Opposition. We name the operator Group5, and suspect they have not been previously-reported. Group5 used “just enough” technical sophistication, combined with social engineering, to target computers and mobile phones with malware.

این گزارش به کمپین رو به رشد حملات فیشینگ علیه کاربران در گستره ایران و حداقل یک حمله به یک فعال غربی می‌پردازد. این حمله‌ها تلاش دارند تا امنیت مضاعفی که از طریق رمز عبور دو مرحله‌ای در گوگل فراهم شده است را دور بزنند و به شکل گسترده‌ای مبتنی بر تماس‌های تلفنی و تلاش برای ورود در زمان حقیقی از سوی مهاجم است. جالب اینجاست که این حمله‌ها عموما با یک تماس تلفنی از کشور انگلستان شروع می‌شده و هکرها به یکی از دو زبان فارسی و یا انگلیسی ارتباط برقرار می‌کرده‌اند.

Citizen Lab partner ASL19 is one of 30 shortlisted candidates for the Dutch government’s Human Rights Tulip award.

Information Controls: Iran’s Presidential Elections is a collaboration between ASL19 and Psiphon. It evaluates the role and impact of information controls during the Iranian Presidential elections in 2013.

In recent months, Iranians who use Facebook and Twitter have begun to see a new, more intimate side of government officials who have opened accounts on these social media platforms. Simple messages like a shared personal photo of President Hassan Rouhani boarding his plane, or a tweet describing his intention to allow access to international information for all Iranians appear to be generating a more direct connection between officials and Iranians both at home and abroad.