In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.

This research note outlines what we know about the use of Hacking Team’s Remote Control System (RCS) by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS). The note synthesizes information found in publicly leaked materials, as well as our own research.

Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert authored an article in the June 2015 edition of the Journal of Democracy, titled “Authoritarianism Goes Global: Cyberspace Under Siege.”

The report, authored by Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons, examines how contemporary telecommunications surveillance is governed in Canada. He concludes that serious failures in transparency and accountability indicate that corporations are failing to manage Canadians’ personal information responsibly and that government irresponsibility surrounding accountability strains its credibility and aggravates citizens’ cynicism about the political process.

UC Browser is the most popular mobile web browser in China and India, boasting over 500 million users. This report provides a detailed analysis of how UC Browser manages and transmits user data, particularly private data, during its operation. Our research was prompted by revelations in a document leaked by Edward Snowden on which the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was preparing a story.

This document describes key identifiers used by mobile devices, highlights some identifiers that are accessible, and often collected, by various parties and the risks associated with the widespread transmission and use of these identifiers.

UC浏览器是一种移动浏览器，它目前拥有超过5亿的注册用户，是中国和印度最受欢迎的手机浏览器。在《啰嗦的松鼠：UC浏览器的隐私与安全问题》这一报告中，公民实验室(Citizen Lab)发现中文和英文安卓版UC浏览器中存在多个隐私及安全漏洞， 并讨论了它们的重要性。

In this article, Sarah McKune calls for the encryption and anonymity debate to address the aspects of human rights that are unique to digital space.

Citizen Lab Senior Legal Researcher Sarah McKune explores the link between the United Nations’ human rights mechanisms and cybersecurity. The post also features an interview with UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression David Kaye.

This post describes our analysis of China’s “Great Cannon,” our term for an attack tool that we identify as separate from, but co-located with, the Great Firewall of China. The first known usage of the Great Cannon is in the recent large-scale novel DDoS attack on both GitHub and servers used by GreatFire.org.