Investigation of a malware campaign targeting the Tibetan community and discussion of the challenges in analyzing closed espionage ecosystems.
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Palo Alto Networks cited the Citizen Lab report entitled “Communities @ Risk: Targeted Threats Against Civil Society.”
Hundreds of members of the Tibetan community are being targeted by email-based malware attacks that leverage the March 10 Tibetan Uprising anniversary as a theme. This report analyzes two March 10 related attacks. One using a new malware family we call MsAttacker , and another using the ShadowNet malware family and command and control infrastructure related to previous campaigns that targeted the Tibetan community.
In this post, we report on “Surtr”, a malware family that has been used in targeted malware campaigns against the Tibetan community since November 2012
This blog post reports on a malware attack in which a compromised version of Kakao Talk, an Android-based mobile messaging client, was sent in a highly-targeted email to a prominent individual in the Tibetan community. The malware is designed to send a user’s contacts, SMS message history, and cellular network location to attackers. This post was updated on 18 April 2013.
The Citizen Lab has analyzed recent targeted malware attacks against Tibetan organizations that share a common payload — LURK malware — and command-and-control server, as well as several other features.
This campaign is the first documented case of one-click mobile exploits used to target Tibetan groups, and reflects an escalation in the sophistication of digital espionage threats targeting the community.
This report describes an inexpensive and technically simple phishing operation. It shows that the continued low adoption rates for digital security features, such as two factor authentication, contribute to the low bar to entry for digital espionage.
In this report we track a malware operation targeting members of the Tibetan Parliament that used known and patched exploits to deliver a custom backdoor known as KeyBoy. We analyze multiple versions of KeyBoy revealing a development cycle focused on avoiding basic antivirus detection.
This report describes the latest iteration in a long-running espionage campaign against the Tibetan community. We describe how the attackers continuously adapt their campaigns to their targets, shifting tactics from document-based malware to conventional phishing