This document provides an explainer to a new report from Citizen Lab and the International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law on the use and human rights implications of algorithmic policing practices in Canada.
The encroachments to OTF highlight why independent and transparent funding sources for research and development on Internet freedom are so important. Providing this type of support within a large government organisation can be difficult. OTF was an example of how to do that right. Losing that example will be a loss not only to the practitioners and researchers that have grown through the support of OTF but the wider community of marginalized people they support.
Over the course of our multi-year investigation, we found that Dark Basin likely conducted commercial espionage on behalf of their clients against opponents involved in high profile public events, criminal cases, financial transactions, news stories, and advocacy. This report highlights several clusters of targets. In future reports, we will provide more details about specific clusters of targets and Dark Basin’s activities.
On May 7 2020, the Citizen Lab published a report that documents how WeChat (the most popular social app in China) conducts surveillance of images and files shared on the platform and uses the monitored content to train censorship algorithms. This document provides a summary of the research findings and questions and answers from the research team.
يفحص هذا التقرير التشفير الذي يحمي الاجتماعات في تطبيق Zoom الرائج. وجدنا أن Zoom لديه نظام تشفير “خاص به” ، ويحتوي على نقاط ضعف كبيرة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك حددنا نقاط تثير القلق في البنية التحتية لـ Zoom ، بما في ذلك نقل مفاتيح التشفير للاجتماعات عبر الصين.
This report examines the encryption that protects meetings in the popular Zoom teleconference app. We find that Zoom has “rolled their own” encryption scheme, which has significant weaknesses. In addition, we identify potential areas of concern in Zoom’s infrastructure, including observing the transmission of meeting encryption keys to China.
This report presents results from a series of research projects that measured responses to personal data requests from telecommunication companies and Internet Service Providers across jurisdictions in Asia including Australia, Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Overall, the projects found responses from telecoms were incomplete and in some cases did not follow what is required by law.
CLSI brings together academics, researchers, activists, and frontline workers and asks them to address some of the most pressing issues at the intersection of digital security and human rights.
What makes a good CLSI Session? The purpose of CLSI is to be an interactive, participant-led workshop that leads to tangible outcomes. The session description should present the problem/issue being examined, the kinds of data that will be used in the session, and description of the current state of the project or activity. Objectives should… Read more »
UPDATE: The 2019 Citizen Lab Summer Institute will take place on July 31-August 2 at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Canada. The Citizen Lab Summer Institute (CLSI) provides a unique opportunity to meet a diverse group of researchers, practitioners, and advocates and develop new and exciting research that addresses pressing questions for the Internet…. Read more »
