Held July 31 – August 2 in Toronto, the Citizen Lab Summer Institute (CLSI) workshop is a meeting place for researchers and practitioners from academia, civil society, and the private sector who are working on Internet openness, security, and rights.
The Information Controls Fellowship Program (ICFP) from the Open Technology Fund (OTF) supports research into how governments in countries, regions, or areas of OTF’s core focus are restricting the free flow of information, cutting access to the open Internet, and implementing censorship mechanisms, thereby threatening the ability of global citizens to exercise basic human rights and democracy; work focused on mitigation of such threats is also supported.
This is a living resource document providing links and descriptions to litigation and other formal complaints concerning digital surveillance and the digital surveillance industry.
We are writing to ask you to ensure that Google drops Project Dragonfly and any plans to launch a censored search app in China, and to re-affirm the company’s 2010 commitment that it won’t provide censored search services in the country.
The Citizen Lab Summer Institute (CLSI) brings together technologists, political scientists, academics, researchers, activists, artists, and members of civil society to address some the most pressing issues at the centre of technology and human rights.
In this post, we develop new Internet scanning techniques to identify 45 countries in which operators of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware may be conducting operations.
Investigation of a malware campaign targeting the Tibetan community and discussion of the challenges in analyzing closed espionage ecosystems.
Citizen Lab validates Amnesty International investigation showing targeting of staff member and Saudi activist with NSO Group’s technology.
The UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Ms. Dubravka Šimonović, recently released her draft report to the Human Rights Council on online violence against women and girls from a human rights perspective. The Special Rapporteur’s report includes many key insights from the Citizen Lab’s formal response on this issue last fall and echoes many of our sixteen key recommendations.
This letter requests a follow up to correspondence Citizen Lab sent to Francisco Partners in February after we discovered the apparent use of the products of its portfolio company, Sandvine, to surreptitiously inject malicious and dubious redirects for users in Turkey, Syria, and Egypt.
