We are releasing a more comprehensive “checklist” consolidating our thoughts on how best to confront the lack of accountability in the commercial spyware trade.
On February 12, 2017 Citizen Lab’s Bitter Sweet report received front page coverage on the New York Times. This research revealed espionage attempts made against public health officials who were opponents of a controversial Mexican soda tax.
Several Cyber Stewards Network Partners have contributed to the 2016 Global Internet Society Watch on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on the Internet, a publication with 46 country reports and other topics.
Several Cyber Stewards Network Partners have contributed to the 2016 Global Internet Society Watch on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on the Internet, a publication with 46 country reports and other topics.
Cyber Stewards network Partners hosted workshops, launched reports, and attended programming at the 2016 Internet Governance Forum in Guadalajara, Mexico from December 6-9, 2016.
December 5-9 – Guadalajara, Mexico
This report describes how a government targeted an internationally recognized human rights defender, Ahmed Mansoor, with the Trident, a chain of zero-day exploits designed to infect his iPhone with sophisticated commercial spyware.
This report describes an extensive malware, phishing, and disinformation campaign active in several Latin American countries, including Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil. The nature and geographic spread of the targets seems to point to a sponsor, or sponsors, with regional, political interests. The attackers, whom we have named Packrat, have shown a keen and systematic interest in the political opposition and the independent press in so-called ALBA countries (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas), and their recently allied regimes.
This post describes the results of Internet scanning we recently conducted to identify the users of FinFisher, a sophisticated and user-friendly spyware suite sold exclusively to governments. We devise a method for querying FinFisher’s “anonymizing proxies” to unmask the true location of the spyware’s master servers. Since the master servers are installed on the premises of FinFisher customers, tracing the servers allows us to identify which governments are likely using FinFisher. In some cases, we can trace the servers to specific entities inside a government by correlating our scan results with publicly available sources.
