This is the Indonesian translation of “IGF 2013: An Overview of Indonesian Internet Infrastructure and Governance,” part one of a four part Citizen Lab series that explores online freedom of expression and the state of information controls in Indonesia in the context of their role as host of the 2013 IGF.

This blog post seeks to map out the infrastructure and governance of ICTs in the country, and explores the trends and challenges regarding the right to freedom of expression and access to information, that is grounded in the universal human rights framework.

An Indonesian translation of this post is available here.

Terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia dari halaman ini tersedia disini.

Building on past network measurements, legal, and policy analyses undertaken by the OpenNet Initiative, we set out to apply a mixed-methods approach to better understand the current situation. Our analysis is set in the context not only of the 2013 IGF, but amidst increasingly intense debates about free expression and access to information, and rapid technological change and development.

This post will summarize Citizen Lab’s prior research on surveillance in Indonesia, including documented evidence of FinFisher command and control servers and Blue Coat Systems devices on IPs owned by Indonesian ISPs. It will then identify recent trends in Indonesian surveillance practices, laws, and regulations that provide potential avenues for further research.

On October 22-25, 2013, Indonesia will host the eighth annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the issues and policies of Internet governance. The main theme of this year’s IGF is “Building Bridges: Enhancing Multi-stakeholder Cooperation for Growth and Sustainable Development.”

This post is the first in a series that will explore online freedom of expression and the state of information controls in Indonesia in the context of their role as host of the IGF.

An Indonesian translation of this post is available here.

Terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia dari halaman ini tersedia disini.

This report details Iran’s increasing Internet controls since 2009, when protests against the victory of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad rocked the country. The election protest campaign–dubbed the “Green Movement”–was marked for the high use of social media and other information and communication technologies (ICT) to organize protests and disseminate information.

The Citizen Lab report “The Canadian Connection: An investigation of Syrian government and Hezbullah web hosting in Canada” and its follow-up, “The Canadian Connection: One Year Later”, have been mentioned in the media in relation to the recent shutting down of Internet networks by the Assad regime in Syria.

This is an update to our November 2011 report titledThe Canadian Connection: An investigation of Syrian government and Hezbullah web hosting in Canada, which examined the use of web servers based in Canada, the U.S., and European countries to host Syrian government websites and websites of the Lebanese political party Hezbullah. Our findings indicate that, while many of the websites we examined in 2011 have changed hosting providers, a number of Syrian government and Hezbullah websites still maintain an online presence through the services of North American and European web hosts.

Citizen Lab’s new report, The Canadian Connection: An investigation of Syrian government and Hezbullah web hosting in Canada was featured in numerous media, including the Globe and Mail.

A new report, entitled The Canadian Connection: An investigation of Syrian government and Hezbullah web hosting in Canada, continues Citizen Lab research into the intersection of the private sector, authoritarianism, and cyberspace regulation, turning our attention to a component of the Internet that does not typically receive the same amount of attention as filtering, surveillance, and computer network attack products and services: web hosting services.